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WHAT IS A LAWYER?
A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAWYER AS AN OFFICER OF THE
COURT

DEBORAH M. HUSSEY FREELAND*
ABSTRACT
This paper engages with the central question in legal ethics concerning the
lawyer’s role, analyzing this fundamental question in terms of professional
identity. Literature in this debate frames the lawyer either as a professional
who exists entirely to serve her client (the “standard conception”), or as a
professional whose primary duties are to the legal system. I reposit and
examine the lawyer’s professional identity as an officer of the court—an
identity marginalized by those who favor the standard conception—noting that
“standard conception” was coined to draw attention to a supplanting threat to
legal professionalism. Providing a uniquely detailed examination of U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence and of U.S. judicial system structure and
function, this investigation yields strong and consistent evidence that the
lawyer’s identity as an officer of the court is the actual, legal standard
conception of the lawyer, as well as the defining basis of her identity—her sine
qua non.
Viewing the formation of the lawyer’s professional identity as an instance
of the formation of an identity generally, in terms of its interpellation,
socialization, and potential suspension or destruction, and examining the
nature of that identity in terms of its performance, suggests that the lawyer’s
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role as court officer gives rise to, encompasses and circumscribes her role as a
client advocate: a court creates a lawyer to exercise her independent
professional judgment in translating between public and private realms,
assisting in the formation of binding connections between the two in
accordance with the rule of law. This observation reconciles a popular
conception of the lawyer with her legal conception, usefully reframing an
entrenched debate in legal ethics.
This novel theoretical approach further suggests that the lawyer’s identity
and professional actions can be understood as links in chains of softly
dialectical synthetic acts that reify the private individual in publicly intelligible
forms. Though this analysis may sound abstract, theorizing the lawyer’s
professional identity is a practical endeavor that considers how procedural
justice and the rule of law are effected in substantial part through the lawyer’s
professional performance from day to day, and offers to lawyers and law
students an understanding of the lawyer’s roles and functions in the
administration of justice that affirms their sense of duty to the courts and helps
them to protect themselves from subversion.
INTRODUCTION
Aspiring lawyers, seasoned practitioners, and scholars urgently debate the
meaning of life—as a lawyer. What does it mean to be a lawyer, and what
should a lawyer do? Use her professional skills to get all she can for her
client? Does she have any meaningful obligation to serve justice or the court
in her work for a client, or are gestures in those directions merely rhetorical
flourishes that do not and should not really affect her practice?
This analysis encounters images of the lawyer in two frames,
foregrounding her duties as either a creature of the court or a tool of the client.
Some commentators attempt to resolve conflicts between the lawyer’s roles in
these frames by arguing that only one frame holds the true or realistic picture
of the lawyer. Some trace the notion of a lawyer as a professional having
public duties to the incipience of the profession and emphasize that a lawyer
has a duty to serve justice (while also advocating for her client); others argue
that a lawyer is simply an agent of the client, owing no real duties to whatever
justice may be, or to her profession, other than those of client advocacy.
Examining the creation and regulation of the lawyer yields a perspective
that encompasses the either and the or, showing how the officer and the
advocate coextend. Theirs are ties among the individual and the collective, the
private and the public, the might-makes-right and the rule of law. Individual
lawyers are fully enmeshed in both roles. A lawyer may feel quandaried by
perceived conflicts of interest between her duties of service to the court and of
client advocacy; the debating bodies of literature feel for the lawyer caught in
role strain between these two nets, and worry her ties to one frame or the other.
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The following analysis relieves the lawyer of neither, but finds a realm of
harmony among their ostensible divergences.
I approach these questions by considering what lawyers are, examining
how they are made by whom, and to what end. A lawyer is commonly
described as an officer of the court, though the significance of her status as
such is contested. A lawyer is also described as an advocate for her client,
though some courts question whether “zealous” advocacy is ethical advocacy.
When these descriptions are thought to conflict, the former role is often
relegated to a rhetorical or aspirational realm, while the latter seems
undeniable. However, unmooring the lawyer’s representation of the client
from the functions of the court of justice undermines the public’s fundamental
interest in the rule of law.
In legal historical and common law discussions of the lawyer’s functions, I
find support for the hypothesis that it matters that the lawyer is an officer of the
court. To assess the extent to which these discussions indicate either a merely
aspirational or a fully realized role for the lawyer, I consider how someone
becomes a lawyer and how a lawyer is related to a court. To complement these
legal and structural analyses, I draw from theories of identity formation,
Hegelian dialectics, and reification to explore what lawyers are. I find that the
lawyer manifests, performs and persists as an officer of the court: if the lawyer
had not been appointed by the court to assist in its administration of justice, she
would not be a lawyer, and she would not be present to re-present her client as
a party to a legal action. The lawyer’s duties of representation run to the court
and to the client—and the latter depend from the former. The lawyer’s
professional identity as an officer of the court matters to the individual lawyer
who may be troubled by perceiving herself narrowly as a zealous advocate, and
matters as well to the efforts of our judicial system in effecting the rule of law.
I. HOW DO LAWYERS HAPPEN?
A.

Legal History

While a comprehensive history of the lawyer’s role lies beyond the scope
of this paper, it is useful to examine relevant aspects of English law that persist
in our inheritance.
A most influential source, William Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England is cited heavily by U.S. courts seeking
legal historical information.1 According to Blackstone, lawyers who represent
parties in court:

1. For example, Westlaw searches identify 373 citations to Blackstone’s Commentaries on
the Laws of England in the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court (256 in majority or leading
opinions), and 5,382 such citations in federal and state courts (4,505 in majority or lead opinions).
See also Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1–17 (1996)
(offering a history of Blackstone’s influence on U.S. law, and collecting citations).
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are admitted to the execution of their office by the superior courts . . . and are
in all points officers of the respective courts in which they are admitted: and,
as they have many privileges on account of their attendance there, so they are
peculiarly subject to the censure and animadversion of the judges. No man can
practise as an attorney in any of those courts, but such as is admitted and sworn
2
an attorney of that particular court . . . .

That is, the court creates the lawyer, who is its officer. Further, this office
affords to the lawyer privileges only as she is subject to the court’s discipline.
The court creates the lawyer through its acts of admitting a person to the bar
and binding her to its service through her sworn oath: without the court’s acts,
no one can act as a lawyer—thus, no one can represent a party before it.
Blackstone indicates not only that lawyers are officers of the court, but
moreover, that the lawyer’s role as the court’s officer is her sine qua non.
Blackstone’s description of the lawyer maps with fidelity onto modern U.S.
lawyers, as discussed below. At a minimum, relevant legal history supports
the hypothesis that a lawyer is an officer of the court, even as she is also a
client advocate.
B.

Court Authority: The Lawyer Is an Officer of the Court, Sui Generis

To find the most authoritative contours of the common-law meaning of
“officer of the court,” I analyze instances of its use in the opinions of the U.S.
Supreme Court. I find that while different aspects of its meaning are
emphasized in different contexts, a fundamentally consistent definition is
clearly identifiable. This observation is helpful in sorting out confusion in the
literature about what it means for a lawyer to be an officer of the court.
A lawyer is clearly an “officer of the court,” as is demonstrated by the
Court’s use of the term in a variety of contexts.3 There are also other genres of

2. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 26 (1769)
(italics added).
3. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986) (“[W]hile we share respondent’s
distaste for the deliberate misleading of an officer of the court, reading Miranda to forbid police
deception of an attorney ‘would cut [the decision] completely loose from its own explicitly stated
rationale.’” (emphasis retained) (quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 (1976)));
United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 466 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(“[A]ttorneys for the Justice Department are officers of the court bound to high ethical
standards.”), superseded by statute on other grounds; Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)
(“In the face of the unequivocal and uncontradicted statement by a responsible officer of the court
that he was fully prepared and ‘ready’ for trial, it was far from an abuse of discretion to deny a
continuance.”); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 n.27 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“As officers of the court, court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary
responsibility not to engage in public debate that will redound to the detriment of the accused or
that will obstruct the fair administration of justice.” (emphasis added)); Mayer v. Chicago, 404
U.S. 189, 199–200 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (referring to “the duty of counsel as officers
of the court to seek only what [transcripts are] needed”); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 520
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officer of the court. For example, judicial officers exercise discretion to decide
the common law, while administrative officers do not.4 The lawyer is neither
of these.5 Instead, the lawyer exercises independent professional discretion in
providing counsel6 to a client, within bounds set by the court. The lawyer is a
special kind of officer, functioning not within the legislative or executive
realms but the judicial, and then not as a judge or administrator, but in a unique
sense. Accordingly, when the Court distinguishes a lawyer from a political
officer or from an administrative or ministerial officer of the court, the Court
does not divest the lawyer of her office, but simply indicates what kind of
officer she is.
For example, the Court notes that a prosecutor requires immunity from
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when functioning “as ‘an officer of the
court,’”7 so that she may exercise her professional judgment in performing her

(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (“The special responsibilities that [petitioner attorney] assumes as
licensee of the State and officer of the court do not carry with them a diminution, however
limited, of his Fifth Amendment rights.”); Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S.
96, 107 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Committee members are usually unpaid and serve in
fulfillment of their obligation to the profession and as officers of the court.”); Am. Commc’ns
Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 405 (1950) (“[T]he relation between the obligations of
membership in the bar and service required by the state in time of war . . . and the strong interest
which every state court has in the persons who become officers of the court were thought
sufficient to justify the state action.”); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 161 (1949) (“[T]he
relationship of the petitioner [a lawyer] as an officer of the court must not be lost sight of.”);
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12 (1933) (“A talesman, sworn as a juror, becomes, like an
attorney, an officer of the court, and must submit to like restraints.”); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (“Attorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to render service when
required by such an appointment.”); Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 226 (1932) (“Nor can it be
doubted that the petitioner here, notwithstanding his presence as an attorney and officer of the
court in the conduct of the principal cause, was not immune from the service of process . . . .”);
Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 631 (1916) (holding that, “[c]onsidering Holmes’ position as
an officer of the court” and other factors, he had received due process); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S.
289, 305–06 (1888) (identifying the petitioner as “an attorney, and, therefore, an officer of the
court”); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 512–13 (1873) (“The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that they possess the requisite qualifications both in character and learning.
They become by such admission officers of the court . . . .”).
4. See, e.g., Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436–37 & n.11 (1993)
(distinguishing judges from court reporters, and noting that “[a] court stenographer,
notwithstanding the fact that he is an officer of the court, by the very nature of his work performs
no judicial function. His duties are purely ministerial and administrative; he has no power of
decision.” (citation omitted)).
5. Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956) (“Certainly nothing that was said in
Ex parte Garland or in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category
as marshals, bailiffs, court clerks or judges.”).
6. Oxford English Dictionary Online, counsel, n., I.1.a (2d ed. 1989) (“Interchange of
opinions on a matter of procedure[.]”).
7. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 128 S. Ct. 855, 861–62 (2009).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

430

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI:425

“basic trial advocacy duties”8 independently of the threat of a retaliatory
lawsuit from a criminal defendant.9 The Court thus identifies the prosecutor as
an officer of the court with a basic duty to advocate for the State—her
advocacy duties inhere in her role as an officer of the court, and are
distinguishable from other administrative duties she may have that are deemed
functionally not to pertain to that role.10 Her role as an officer of the court
affords the prosecutor immunity to support her advocacy function—which
flows from and does not relieve her of her primary duty to uphold the law and
protect the integrity of the judicial process.11
In a contrasting example, the Court regards the public defender differently
from the prosecutor in informative respects. In Ferri v. Ackerman the Court
defines another contour of the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court: a lawyer
appointed pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act by a federal court to represent
an indigent criminal defendant was deemed not to be entitled to absolute
immunity from a malpractice suit by the defendant.12 Though both are federal
officers, the pivotal difference between the prosecutor (who represents the
state) and the public defender (who represents a client against the state) is that
to perform her duties of representation as an officer of the court, the public
defender must be able “to act independently of the Government and oppose it

8. Id. at 863.
9. Id. at 859 (“Over a half-century ago Chief Judge Learned Hand explained that a
prosecutor’s absolute immunity reflects ‘a balance’ of ‘evils.’ ‘[I]t has been thought in the end
better,’ he said, ‘to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those
who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.’” (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949))).
10. Id. at 861–862; see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33 (1976):
We recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State
involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the
courtroom. . . . At some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt
functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court. Drawing a proper line
between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case does not require us
to anticipate them.
Notably, drawing a line between these functions does not negate the officer-of-the-court function.
See also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1993) (applying the functional test of
Imbler to distinguish the prosecutor-as-investigator from the prosecutor as advocate-and-officer
of the court); Johnson v. Rex, 474 U.S. 967, 967 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“Here the prosecutor was acting as an officer of the court in ensuring compliance with
the Miranda requirements . . . .”).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 522 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part):
It is difficult to imagine that a series of intentional violations of defendants’ constitutional
rights by Government prosecutors who are officers of the court charged with upholding
the law would not have a considerable detrimental effect on the integrity of the process
and call for judicial action designed to restore order and integrity to the process.
12. 444 U.S. 193 (1979).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

WHAT IS A LAWYER?

431

in adversary litigation.”13 The Court held that because the lawyer had been
appointed to represent a party adverse to the state, the primary rationale for
granting immunity to judges and prosecutors who need “the maximum ability
to deal fearlessly and impartially with the public at large”14 did not apply to
her: while immunity from liability to a criminal defendant “for certain claims
arising out of the performance of their official duties”15 helps the judge and
prosecutor perform their official functions, such immunity from suit by a client
criminal defendant would not help appointed defense counsel perform her
official function as a court officer entrusted with representing the accused.
Even as it distinguishes her from “other federal officers[,]”16 the Court
explicitly recognizes and treats defense counsel as a “federal officer”17 and
officer of the court:
There is, however, a marked difference between the nature of counsel’s
responsibilities and those of other officers of the court. As public servants, the
prosecutor and the judge represent the interest of society as a whole. . . .
. . . [The] duty [of appointed counsel] is not to the public at large, except in
that general way. His principal responsibility is to serve the undivided
interests of his client. Indeed, an indispensable element of the effective
performance of his responsibilities is the ability to act independently of the
18
Government and to oppose it in adversary litigation.

By ignoring the bolded language, one could mistakenly read Ferri to state that
defense counsel is not an officer of the court, and owes duties only to the
undivided interests of her client. Instead—even in this limit of representing the
private criminal defendant against the public—the Court maintains the
lawyer’s foundational duty to the public as an officer of the court. Then, given
that duty, her principal responsibility as a public defender is to represent
criminal defendants against the state.
Similarly, a public defender is not deemed to be a state actor in certain
respects, because her duty to the state to assist in providing a fair trial to the
criminally accused requires her to advocate a position that is adverse to the
state. For example, in Georgia v. McCollum the Court relies on Polk County v.
Dodson in distinguishing an officer of the court from a state actor under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.19 In Dodson Chief Justice Burger emphasizes that, “[t]he

13. Id. at 204.
14. Id. at 203.
15. Id. at 202.
16. Id.
17. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 202.
18. Id. at 202–04 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
19. 505 U.S. 42, 64 (1992) (“‘[U]nder color of state law’ for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 . . . ‘a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state
actor[.]” (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added to limiting language) (quoting Polk Cnty. v.
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advocate, as an officer of the court which issued the commission to practice,
owes an obligation to the court to repudiate any external effort to direct how
the obligations to the client are to be carried out,”20 including efforts made by
the lawyer’s employer. At the time of his writing, a showing of state
employment ordinarily would suffice to establish that the employee was a state
actor; for the public defender, however, the Court required not only state
employment but also a functional analysis to determine whether the public
defender was acting under color of state law.21
In Dodson the Chief Justice peels the onion of the lawyer’s duties, which
run first to the court that commissioned her as its officer, in turn to represent
the accused client against the state—and emphasizes that this duty-structure is
independent of the lawyer’s source of compensation. This point has at least as
much force when the client is not adverse to the state: the lawyer is an officer
of the court who serves the court by representing a client before it, regardless
of whether and how much the client pays the lawyer for the service of
representation.22 To the extent that the “standard conception” of the lawyer
relies on the client’s payment for the lawyer’s legal services, the standard
conception is insupportable.23

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (explaining that “a defense lawyer characteristically opposes
the designated representatives of the State[,]” because the “system assumes that adversarial
testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness”))). On the latter point, see
also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 n.14 (1973) (“[T]he duty of the lawyer, subject to his role
as an ‘officer of the court,’ is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful means, even when
those interests are in conflict with the interests of the United States or of a State.” (emphasis
added)).
20. 454 U.S. at 327 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
21. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 54.
22. See, e.g., FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 453 (1990) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Attorneys are not merely participants in a
competitive market for legal services; they are officers of the court.”); People ex rel. Karlin v.
Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928) (citation omitted):
“Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.” The appellant was
received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private gain. He became an
officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends
of justice.
Chief Judge Cardozo’s description of the lawyer as an instrument in the administration of justice
who does not manifest exclusively as a businessperson has been quoted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957), In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644
(1985), and Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S.
296, 310 (1989) (holding that a lawyer could not be compelled to represent an indigent client pro
bono exclusively on the basis of permissive, not mandatory, statutory authority: “We emphasize
that our decision today is limited to interpreting § 1915(d). We do not mean to question, let alone
denigrate, lawyers’ ethical obligation to assist those who are too poor to afford counsel . . . . On
the contrary . . . .”).
23. See also infra Part II.B.
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In Griffiths the Court makes a similar distinction in considering the
Constitutionality of a state’s requiring citizenship for admission to its bar:
though lawyers are officers of the court, they are not therefore political
officers; thus, a bar applicant may be required to take the oath of office in good
faith, but may not be required to be a citizen of the state.24 The Griffiths Court
opines that “the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an ‘officer of the
court,’ is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful means, even when
those interests are in conflict with the interests of the United States or of a
State.”25 This description of the lawyer is vulnerable to misinterpretation: a
citation that elides or simply ignores the bolded language strips the lawyer of
her primary professional identity as an officer of the court, rendering her
merely an agent of her client.
Instead, the distinctions articulated by the Court between a lawyer and a
state official are actually distinctions between a lawyer qua officer of the court,
and an elected official—rather than denials that the lawyer holds any kind of
office. For some Justices, even this distinction hems the lawyer’s role too
high:
I am unwilling to accept what seems to me a denigration of the posture and
role of a lawyer as an “officer of the court.” . . . In the common-law tradition
the lawyer becomes the attorney—the agent—for [the] client only by virtue of
26
his having been first invested with power by the State, usually by a court.

Distinction between the officer of the court and the political officer may
strengthen the independence and credibility of the judiciary by separating the
judicial from the other branches of government: the affirmation that the lawyer
is a court officer indicates that the lawyer clearly serves the state by assisting
the judiciary in the administration of justice, though she does not directly
determine state policy. Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist
resisted this distinction precisely because it may signal to some that a lawyer is
not an officer at all, despite the Court’s care to explain that this is not the case:
The concept of a lawyer as an officer of the court and hence part of the
official mechanism of justice in the sense of other court officers, including the
judge, albeit with different duties, is not unique in our system but it is a
significant feature of the lawyer’s role in the common law. This concept has
sustained some erosion over the years at the hands of cynics who view the
lawyer much as the “hired gun” of the Old West. In less flamboyant terms the

24. See, e.g., Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 729 (“Nor does the status of holding a license to practice
law place one so close to the core of the political process as to make him a formulator of
government policy.”); Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283 (1985) (“Because, under
Griffiths, a lawyer is not an ‘officer’ of the State in any political sense, there is no reason for New
Hampshire to exclude from its bar nonresidents.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
25. 413 U.S. at 724 n.14 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 730–31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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lawyer in his relation to the client came to be called a “mouthpiece” in the
27
gangland parlance of the 1930’s.

Chief Justice Burger later dissented from the Court’s admission to practice
before it several lawyers who had conducted themselves unprofessionally, out
of concern that the Court was failing in its duty to uphold the integrity of
judicial proceedings:
“Their admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial
power. It is the exercise of judicial power. . . .”
. . . [I]t is not a proper exercise of this Court’s judicial power merely to “rubber
28
stamp” applications for admission.

Chief Justice Burger’s view in Patterson v. General Motors Corp. recalls that
of Justice Field in Ex parte Garland,29 which was influenced by Judge
Selden’s analysis in In re Cooper.30 Cooper reviewed the history of those who
represent clients before a court over several hundred years; Judge Selden noted
that “attorneys [are] a class of public officers”31—and “not only officers of the
court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a
judicial nature.”32 Thus, though distinctions between the officer of the court
and other kinds of public officer have arisen in various contexts over time, they
have not unmoored the lawyer from her role as an officer of the court in
Supreme Court jurisprudence.33
The contexts in which these distinctions have placed the most pressure on
the lawyer’s role as a subject of the court are—as in the context of the public
defender adverse to the state—those in which the lawyer’s ability to exercise
her independent professional judgment most requires protection. The record in
27. Id. at 731.
28. Patterson v. General Motors Corp., 1981 U.S. Lexis 246, at *4 (May 18, 1981) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378–79
(1867)); see also In re Caplinger, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 247, at *6 (May 18, 1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (“Attorneys are officers of the court appointed to assist the court in the administration
of justice.” (quoting In re Monaghan, 222 A.2d 665, 676 (Vt. 1966) (Holden, C.J., dissenting)));
In re Brose, 1983 U.S. Lexis 166, at *9 (June 20, 1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Of course an
attorney is required to advocate zealously the interests of the client, but there are limits to that
advocacy. An attorney is an officer of the court . . . .”).
29. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 378–79.
30. 22 N.Y. 67 (1860).
31. Id. at 90.
32. Id. at 84.
33. See, e.g., Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 378 (“Attorneys and counsellors are not officers
of the United States; they are not elected or appointed in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution for the election and appointment of such officers. They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order . . . .”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974)
(“Respondent’s suggestion would sweep all lawyers under the New York Times rule as officers of
the court and distort the plain meaning of the ‘public official’ category [in First Amendment law]
beyond all recognition. We decline to follow it.”).
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Cammer v. United States showed that a lawyer had worked methodically and
resourcefully to ensure that he was using appropriate means to test a grand jury
for bias against his client.34 The district court nonetheless held him in
contempt for doing so, citing a statute that granted a court discretionary power
to punish the “[m]isbehavior of any of its officers in their official
transactions.”35 The Court noted that lawyers are officers of the court, but that
a lawyer is not a conventional kind of officer.36 The Court emphasized that the
lawyer is (also) engaged in a profession in which she makes her own decisions
and runs her own business, to illustrate that lawyers need a space in which to
exercise their professional judgment without fear of retribution from an unruly
judge.37 The Cammer Court was working very carefully to protect the
lawyer’s ability to exercise her independent professional judgment from the
judge’s power to hold the lawyer in contempt without due process; to protect
lawyers from this kind of arbitrary exercise of judicial power, the Court
distinguished lawyers as officers of the court from other kinds of court officers
to whom the statute would apply. Thus, Cammer held narrowly that “a lawyer
is not the kind of ‘officer’ who can be summarily tried for contempt under 18
U.S.C. § 401(2)”38—Cammer did not hold that a lawyer is a businessperson
rather than a court officer.
Indeed, Justice Reed concurred separately “solely on the ground that the
circumstances leading to the enactment of this statute dictate the Court’s
otherwise unique reading of the term ‘officers of the court.’”39 Although the
Court has taken great care to preserve the lawyer’s identity as an officer of the
court in distinguishing her from other kinds of officers, language like that in
Cammer is vulnerable to chop-logic—to out-of-context quotation to prop the
contrary assertion that a lawyer is not an officer of the court.
Like the Supreme Court, state courts regard lawyers as their officers,
especially in providing for their appointment, regulation and dismissal—
processes by which the court invests the lawyer with a duty-bound office,

34. 350 U.S. 399, 400 (1956).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 401(2) (2006).
36. Cammer, 350 U.S. at 405.
37. Id. at 405–407. Cammer recites the horror story of a Judge Peck who summarily had
held an attorney in contempt after the attorney had published a criticism of one of the judge’s
opinions; the judge later narrowly escaped impeachment, and the Contempt Act of 1831 was
passed to prevent more such abuses of lawyers by judges. Accordingly, this emphasis was made
to protect lawyers from “subject[ion] to summary trials by judges without the safeguards of
juries and regular court procedure.” Id. at 406–407.
38. Id. at 407–08.
39. Id. at 408 (Reed, J., concurring).
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defines the officer’s functions, and suspends and removes a malfunctioning
lawyer from that office.40
From this analysis of court authority, it is reasonable to infer that a lawyer
is indeed an officer of the court, and that this office carries meaningful duties
in the administration of justice. Courts have the power to confer or rescind the
office of lawyer, and to enforce the lawyer’s obedience. In a sense, the Court
constitutes the lawyer, creating a person’s identity as a lawyer subject to its
power.
C. Structural Analysis
Even if neither legal history nor common law were to identify lawyers as
the court’s officers, one could determine whether they were in effect, by
comparing what it means to be an officer with the lawyer’s relationship to the
court. An apposite definition of “officer” is: “an appointed or elected
functionary in the administration of local government, a public corporation,
institution, etc., and in early use esp[ecially] in the administration of law or
justice.”41 By definition from the Oxford English Dictionary (which itself
offers a historical record, tracing and archiving the etymology of the language)
it is appropriate to refer to an appointed functionary in the administration of
law or justice as an “officer.” The same source defines “court” as an assembly
in which justice is administered.42 The judge clearly falls within these
definitions: he is an appointed (or elected) functionary in the administration of
justice in a court—the highest officer of his court.43

40. See, e.g., About Us, ST. BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs.aspx
(“All State Bar members are officers of the court.”) (last visited May 20, 2012); Officer of the
Court, NORTH CAROLINA CT. SYS., http://testweb.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/Professiona
lism/Officer.asp (last visited May 20, 2012). In Indiana a lawyer who has been suspended may
be reinstated when, inter alia, she “can safely be recommended . . . to aid in the administration of
justice as a member of the bar and an officer of the Courts.” INDIANA RULES OF COURT: RULES
FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND THE DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS 23 § 4(b)(7) (2012), available
at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/ad_dis/index.html.
41. Oxford English Dictionary Online, officer, n., 1.b (Draft Revision, Dec. 2008). This
source is cited for linguistic evidence of social or discursive structures—of the valences among
terms that describe aspects of these structures.
42. Oxford English Dictionary Online, court, n., IV.11.a (2d ed. 1989) (“An assembly of
judges or other persons legally appointed and acting as a tribunal to hear and determine any
cause, civil, ecclesiastical, military, or naval. Justice was in early times administered in
assemblies held by the sovereign personally . . . then by judges who followed the king as officers
of his court . . . .”).
43. Id.; see also Oxford English Dictionary Online, judge, n., 1.a (2d ed. 1989) (“A public
officer appointed to administer the law; one who has authority to hear and try causes in a court of
justice.”); Oxford English Dictionary Online, judicature, n., 1 (2d ed. 1989) (“The action of
judging; administration of justice by duly constituted courts; judicial process. Often in phr[ase:
‘]court of judicature.[‘]”).
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A person who wishes to become a lawyer44 must apply to the bar45 for a
license to practice law. Typically, she applies to the highest court in the state
for admission to the legal profession. The court will consent only if the
applicant meets its criteria for legal competence and the moral character
necessary to the profession.46 The criterion of legal competence is usually met
with educational credentials and a passing score on an examination of legal
knowledge and analysis administered by the bar.47 Criteria relating to moral
character48 are typically met by an investigation of the applicant’s background
and an examination on the rules of professional conduct.49 Though the court

44. Oxford English Dictionary Online, lawyer, n., 1.a (2d ed. 1989) (“a member of the legal
profession”).
45. “Bar” means “court.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, bar, n., III.22.a (2d ed. 1989)
(“The barrier or wooden rail marking off the immediate precinct of the judge’s seat, at which
prisoners are stationed for arraignment, trial, or sentence.”); see also III.23.a (“This barrier, as the
place at which all the business of the court was transacted, soon became synonymous with: Court
. . . .”).
46. See, e.g., RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND (2009), available
at http://www.courts.state.md.us/ble/pdfs/baradmissionrules.pdf; RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE
BAR – MINNESOTA 5 (2011), available at https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/court_rules/rule.
php?type=pr&subtype=admi&id=5; FLORIDA RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT RELATING TO
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR 1-14.2 (2011), available at http://www.floridabarexam.org/public/
main.nsf/rules.html; Overview, COLORADO SUP. CT., BOARD OF L. EXAMINERS, http://www.col
oradosupremecourt.com/BLE/ble_home.htm (last visited May 20, 2012).
47. See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR ASS’N,
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 1–13 (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2012_comp_
guide_for_web.authcheckdam.pdf; Description and Grading of the California Bar Examination,
ST. B. OF CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE OF B. EXAMINERS/OFF. OF ADMISSIONS, http://admis
sions.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wriqbATHUwY%3D&tabid=270 (last visited May
20, 2012); Admission Requirements, ST. B. OF NEVADA, http://www.nvbar.org/content/admis
sion-requirements (last visited May 20, 2012); Washington Bar Exam Information and
Application, WASHINGTON ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/
Admissions/Bar-Exam-Admissions/Application-and-Exam-Information (last visited May 20,
2012).
48. See, e.g., Statement on Moral Character Requirement for Admission to Practice Law in
California, ST. B. OF CALIFORNIA, http://admissions.calbar.ca.gov/MoralCharacter/State
ment.aspx (last visited May 20, 2012); Kathryn L. Allen & Jerome Braun, Admission to the Bar—
Character and Fitness Considerations, OFF. OF B. ADMISSIONS FOR THE ST. OF GEORGIA,
http://www.gabaradmissions.org/pages/braun.php (last visited May 20, 2012).
49. See, e.g., State Board of Law Examiners, MARYLAND JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.
state.md.us/ble/index.html (last visited May 20, 2012); The State Bar of California: What Does It
Do? How Does It Work?, ST. B. OF CALIFORNIA, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?file
ticket=SQpY73pa3F4%3D&tabid=212 (last visited May 20, 2012); Overview, NEW YORK ST.
SUP. CT., COMMITTEE ON CHARACTER & FITNESS, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad1/Com
mittees&Programs/CFC/index.shtml (last visited May 20, 2012); What Are the Responsibilities of
the Character and Fitness Committee?, ST. OF VERMONT JUDICIARY, http://www.vermontjudi
ciary.org/Lists/l-FAQs/DispForm.aspx?ID=289 (last visited May 20, 2012).
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may rely on a dedicated institution for processing applications,50 the court
itself retains the authority to determine whether to appoint the applicant to an
office of the court.51 If the court decides to admit the applicant, the court binds
the applicant to itself with her oath, for example, to support the Constitution of
the United States and that of the court’s state, and to “serve, protect, foster and
promote the fair and impartial administration of justice.”52 Were the court to
decline to take this action, the applicant would not become a lawyer. Only
through the consent of the state is a lawyer born.
Rhetorically, the metaphor of birth for the transformation of a layperson
into a professional evokes an image of the appearance of a distinct being. This
metaphor does more than simply offer an image: it focuses our attention on the
physical and symbolic processes that create a lawyer where before there was
none. The Socratic method of pedagogy entails “assisting a person to become
fully conscious of ideas previously latent in the mind.”53 Similarly, the
appearance of this distinct being is achieved through an analogous Socratic
process in which something latent is realized, or becomes real. The Socratic
process is assisted: it requires someone to act as a midwife, or have a
“maieutic” function.54

50. For example, the “State Bar of California is an administrative arm of the California
Supreme Court[,]” which deals directly with bar admissions on behalf of the court. ST. B. OF
CALIFORNIA, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/ (last visited May 20, 2012); see also The State Bar of
California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note 49; About the Bar, VIRGINIA ST.
B.: AN AGENCY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, http://www.vsb.org/site/about (last
visited May 20, 2012); About the WSBA: Governance, WASHINGTON ST. B. ASS’N,
http://www.wsba.org/About-WSBA/Governance (last visited May 20, 2012) (“The WSBA is an
administrative arm of the Washington State Supreme Court.”).
51. See, e.g., State Board of Law Examiners, supra note 49; About Us, supra note 40 (“All
State Bar members are officers of the court.”); INDIANA RULES OF COURT: RULES FOR
ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND THE DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS 3 § 1 (2012), available at
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/ad_dis/index.html.
52. NJCOP [New Jersey Commission on Professionalism] Principles and Pledge[:] The
Lawyer’s Pledge, NEW JERSEY ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.njsba.com/resources/njcop/njcopprinciple-prof.html (last visited May 20, 2012); see also George H. Hathaway, Plain Language[:]
A Plain English Lawyer’s Oath, ST. B. OF MICHIGAN, http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/plain
english/columns/142.cfm (last visited May 20, 2012); Arkansas Supreme Court, Oath (“I will
endeavor always to advance the cause of justice . . . .”) (available from the Clerk of the Arkansas
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals (on file with the author)); ALASKA BAR RULES 5 § 3
(2012), available at http://www.courts.alaska.gov/bar.htm (affirmation to “strive to improve both
the law and the administration of justice.”). See generally Carol Rice Andrews, The Lawyer’s
Oath: Both Ancient and Modern, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3 (2009).
53. Oxford English Dictionary Online, maieutic, adj. and n., A.adj. (Draft Revision Sept.
2008) (“Relating to or designating the Socratic process, or other similar method, of assisting a
person to become fully conscious of ideas previously latent in the mind.”).
54. Id.
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The metaphor of birth also engages Hegel’s description of dialectical
reasoning. For Hegel, the dialectical process of syllogism mediates and unifies
extremes or opposites to produce a higher-order truth; further, latent within
these opposites is their unity.55 Describing Hegel’s concept of truth-production
through unification in Fichte’s terms,56 in this dialectical process a thesis and
its antithesis are merged into a higher truth, or synthesis. To adapt these terms
to the creation of a lawyer, I first propose a softer dialectic relationship that
relaxes the requirement of opposition: this relationship exists between
complements that need not be opposites. The dialectical unification of these
complements produces a synthesis that is a new entity, which may (but need
not) be regarded as a “truth.” The production of the new entity (such as a
lawyer), or (professional) identity, can involve a maieutic function, either
actually or figuratively. The maieutic function can consist of the acts of a
person (such as a judge) or institution (such as a court) that assist in the
realization or materialization of something (such as an applicant to the bar) in a
new form.
I refer to the creation of the lawyer as her materialization as a professional:
of course, she existed as a person before her transformation into a member of
the legal profession, but she did not exist as a lawyer, or in the form of a
lawyer, with all of a lawyer’s abilities and responsibilities. Pertinently, as a
layperson she could not advocate for or represent others in litigation—she did
not materialize as a lawyer in court. I use “materialization” to refer to the
process of her mattering57—or bodying forth—as a lawyer.
If the result of this birth is a lawyer, the moment of birth is that of taking
the lawyer’s oath. The moment of swearing the oath is transformative: the
layperson undertakes to manifest the law through her own actions, at once
becoming a lawyer and in turn dedicating herself to the maieutic work of
making the rule of law a reality. In and through performing this act she
becomes a lawyer: the Constitution constitutes her as its servant. She is knit
and bound by it, as she was not a moment before. The performative act of
swearing the oath of the legal profession is a speech act that produces the
lawyer as an officer of the court. The judge giving the oath of this office is
engaged in a maieutic process that bodies the lawyer forth as the court’s
officer.

55. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 588–90 (George di
Giovanni ed. and trans., 2010).
56. JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE, Review of Aenesidemus, in FICHTE, EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS (D. Breazeale ed. and trans., 1988).
57. Judith Butler usefully defines “matter” as to “materialize, and to mean,” in discussing
intelligibility. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 32 (1993). I borrow these terms for my
analysis of the transformation of something that does not appear or read properly in our judicial
processes, into something that does.
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Before her birth into the legal profession, the applicant prepared and was
prepared for it through a process comprising her legal education in substance,
analysis and ethics, her moral character assessment, and her passing a bar
examination. Through these interactions the legal profession interpellates58
her, or calls her, to be a lawyer, conceiving of her as a potential lawyer. I use
“interpellation” to point to the way in which a person or an institution can call
something forth, giving rise to or engendering it through rhetorical and other
acts which signal that the interpellated subject would be recognized or legible
in the discourse59 (here, in the legal profession). When the subject responds to
interpellation with acts that are appropriate to the discursive realm of the
interpellation, her responses manifest, or matter in that realm. Meanwhile, acts
that are inappropriate to the discursive realm fail to materialize in it: they do
not matter; they are meaningless. Behaviors that negate the interpellation may
be legible in the discourse: they may matter in a negative sense, and in return
they interpellate discouragement or sanction from the structure that attempts to
call the subject forth. The process of interpellation that prepares one to
materialize as a lawyer is a process of socialization into the legal profession.
Interpellation is an act of subject-formation in that it conceives of a
subject, calling or inviting the subject to form. Maieusis is an act of subjectformation in that it denotes the actual appearance of the subject in a discursive
realm, the realization of the latent hope of interpellation. The discursive realm
of the legal profession, and the laity that is its supplement, can be understood
to be in a dialectical relationship that synthesizes the lawyer. The mechanisms
of this production include the invitation (the question of identity) that
interpellates the lawyer from the laity, the swearing of the oath (the answer)
that unites the layperson and the discursive realm, and the swearing judge’s
maieutic work that transforms the applicant into a lawyer, moving her into the
discursive realm of the law, making her a real legal actor. This dialectical
mechanism works properly to form a lawyer when it conforms to the ethics of
the legal discourse; that is, discursive ethics attend interpellation and maieusis,
subject-formation and performance.

58. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 85, 117–20 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971). Althusser used this
term to discuss ideology and the formation of a subject. I find this term useful for examining the
general problem of the creation of an identity within a discursive structure.
59. Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Maieusis Through a Gated Membrane: “Getting the
Science Right” in Public Decisionmaking, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 373, 386–87 (2007).
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Thus, a person can only materialize as a lawyer if a court appoints60 her to
the bar as a functionary61 in the administration of law or justice.62 The court’s
elaborate provisions for a person’s application and potential admission to
practice demonstrate that the court views those whom they appoint to the legal
profession—lawyers—as officers of the court, sworn to the administration of
justice from the moment of their formation.
The presence of the lawyer is therefore a materialization of the court’s
power. The lawyer is a subject of the court’s power to form its officers, which
begins with the court’s acts of admission. The lawyer is also subject to this
power, which subtends the officer persistently through the term of her service
(this term may extend throughout her life, but only while it is afforded by the
court). The court has various means of directing its officers’ professional
conduct. When a lawyer appears in court as an advocate, the lawyer’s conduct
is subject to rules (such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal or state
rules of court, local rules, and the standing orders of the presiding judge),
regulations to which the lawyer’s performance must conform. The rules shape
her demeanor and dress—her actions and costume on the court stage. Though
her speech may be her own improvisation, her privilege to speak is constrained
by the responsibilities to the court that she assumes in order to appear and act
on stage. The lawyer may incur the court’s contempt. Where the law and rules
do not explicitly address a court’s need to regulate its officers’ conduct, the
court has inherent powers to sanction and otherwise rein that conduct.
The court not only makes its officers, but also disciplines them. To
discipline is to “train to habits of order and subordination.”63 The court
(optionally through its bar association) may require every officer to keep her
legal education current through documented, accredited, substantive study.64
The court may provide a hotline to assist its officers who are uncertain as to
what would be the most ethically appropriate course of action in a given
situation.65 If a lawyer’s performance is compromised by psychological or
60. Admission is synonymous with appointment. Oxford English Dictionary Online,
admission, 2 (2d ed. 1989) (“Reception or acceptance into an office or position; appointment,
institution.”).
61. Oxford English Dictionary Online, functionary, n. (2d ed. 1989) (“One invested with a
function; one who has certain functions or duties to perform; an official.”).
62. The administration of justice is a function of the court. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
63. Oxford English Dictionary Online, discipline, v., 1.a. (2d ed. 1989).
64. See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 47, at
45–46; The State Bar of California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note 49;
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT RULES 31(2011), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/scrule/
DisplayDocument.html?content=html&seqNo=36666.
65. See, e.g., The State Bar of California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note
49; Grievance and Ethics Information, ST. B. OF TEXAS, http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.
cfm?Section=Grievance_Info_and_Ethics_Helpline&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&Conte
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other problems, the court may offer confidential, rehabilitative support.66 The
court acts to assure that its officers’ conduct conforms to the professional
ethics described in legal education, in the rules of courts and bar associations at
all levels, and in the bar’s moral character requirements. In a sense the court is
always calling forth and forming its officers.
Discipline “form[s]” its subject “to proper conduct and action.”67 The
legal profession serves the essential public function of upholding the rule of
law, and public trust has afforded the profession some privileges of selfregulation.68 The court may invite and analyze complaints from the public,
attempt to reshape troubled attorney-client relationships, and temporarily
inactivate or even permanently remove lawyers from office if the court deems
that action appropriate after reviewing the lawyer’s conduct.69 Officers of the
court also socialize themselves qua officers, for example, through the activities
of the American Bar Association and other voluntary professional
associations.70

ntID=15697 (last visited May 20, 2012); The Utah State Bar’s Office of Professional Conduct’s
(“OPC”) Ethics Hotline for Attorneys, OFF. OF PROF. CONDUCT, UTAH ST. B., http://www.utah
bar.org/opc/opc_ethics_hotline.html (last visited May 20, 2012); Answering Your Questions
About Legal Ethics, VIRGINIA ST. B., http://www.vsb.org/profguides/FAQ_leos/LegalEthics
FAQs.html (last visited May 20, 2012).
66. See, e.g., The State Bar of California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note
49; Guide to the Colorado Attorney Assistance Program (CAAP), COLORADO SUP. CT.,
http://www.coloradosupremecourt.com/Registration/CAAP.htm (last visited May 20, 2012);
Betty M. Shaw, Psychological Fitness: Dealing with Mental Health Issues, MINNESOTA LAW.
PROF. RESP. BOARD, http://lprb.mncourts.gov/articles/Articles/Psychological%20Fitness-%20
Dealing%20With%20Mental%20Health%20Issues.pdf (last visited May 20, 2012); History and
Purpose of NHLAP, NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW. ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, http://www.lapnh.org/his
tory.html (last visited May 20, 2012).
67. Oxford English Dictionary Online, discipline, n., 3.a (2d ed. 1989). Like legal
education, professional discipline is part of the process of socialization and identity formation of
a lawyer. See Oxford English Dictionary Online, socialize, v., 2 (Draft Revision Jun. 2010) (“to
instil in (a person) the values and norms of his or her society or group.”).
68. Geoffrey Hazard analyzes lawyers’ diminishing self-regulation and increasing regulation
by the courts in Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239 (1991).
Viewing lawyers as the court’s officers suggests that the court’s regulation of lawyers should be
regarded as a form of self-regulation. Nonetheless, the legalization of professional norms
transforms questions of professionalism that had been addressed informally among lawyers into
more generic questions of legal liability.
69. The State Bar of California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note 49
(noting that The State Bar of California has a dedicated State Bar Court for disciplinary hearings);
Attorney Discipline System, NEW HAMPSHIRE JUD. BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.nh.us/com
mittees/attydiscip/index.htm (last visited May 20, 2012); Missouri’s Lawyer Discipline System,
MISSOURI B., http://www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/Legal_Resources/Bro
chures_and_Booklets/Client_Resource_Guide/discipline.pdf (last visited May 20, 2012).
70. For evidence of peer socialization, see, e.g., Association Goals, AM. B. ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/utility/about_the_aba/association_goals.html (last visited May 20,
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This analysis of the lawyer’s relationship to the court indicates that lawyers
are de facto officers of the court. The court creates and shapes lawyers;
lawyers are always already creatures of the court.
II. WHY DO LAWYERS HAPPEN?
We have seen how the court71 invites a layperson to apply to the legal
profession, how an applicant is appointed to assist the court in its
administration of justice, and how an applicant becomes an officer of the court
by swearing the lawyer’s oath. In other words, the court interpellates the
lawyer, calling forth the formation of that subject, and a layperson learns to
respond in the terms of the legal discourse. This question and answer, or thesis
and antithesis, are synthesized in the maieutic moment of the judge’s
administering and the applicant’s taking the lawyer’s oath of office: a lawyer is
born.
This Part moves from the lawyer’s structural situation—the embeddedness
of her professional identity in the legal system—to the examination of her
function in that system.
A.

Why Does the Court Create Lawyers?

What does it mean for a private person to materialize as a lawyer? To
come into the world of law is to cross a threshold into a realm that is distinct
from the ordinary world of the private citizen. Law can be thought of as an
institution or a discursive realm defined—shaped and bounded—by legal
standards, rules, ethics, and norms within which actions proper to the law
materialize. “Professional” actions are those appropriate to the discursive
realm. The professional acts of the lawyer enact the discourse, in a sense
forming it, presenting and re-presenting it as a stage-actor performs a play: the
text of the play comes to life through her actions before the audience. The
lawyer is an integral part of the discursive structure of law; the rule of law is
realized in part through her professional performance, and not through that of
the judge acting alone.

2012); Ethics Opinions, FLORIDA B., http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBETOpin.nsf/Ethics
Index?OpenForm (last visited May 20, 2012); Ethics Committee, BOSTON B. ASS’N,
http://www.bostonbar.org/sc/ethics/index.htm (last visited May 20, 2012); Ethics Opinions, LOS
ANGELES COUNTY B. ASS’N, PROF. RESP. & ETHICS COMMITTEE, http://www.lacba.org/show
page.cfm?pageid=427 (last visited May 20, 2012).
71. “The court” may be used generally to refer to the judicial system, or in any specific
instance, to refer to a particular court that performs this function. It is occasionally debated
whether a lawyer is an officer of the court or is instead an officer of the legal system. A lawyer is
both an officer of the specific court(s) before which she is admitted to practice, and an officer of
the judicial system of which the court is a part (and clearly, the judicial system is part of the legal
system more generally).
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The discursive realm of the court is one in which only certain kinds of
statements can be made, only at particular times, only in specific ways, and
only by particular people acting in given capacities. This discursive realm is
not as fully scripted as that of a play on a stage, yet the comparison is useful.
The judge directs the action, the advocating lawyers (those who lend their
voices) are the actors cast in speaking roles, and the parties are the characters
(those whom the lawyers represent); the script has some passages explicitly set
by law, while others are improvisations that must meet criteria known to the
actors and director. The parties and the fact-finders in some respects map into
a critical audience, although as in some plays, they may be called upon to
express themselves directly within given constraints.
As in the theatre, the script defines various boundaries within which the
action will take place. The court’s script is more an elaborate set of stage
directions than a text to be spoken; as an officer of the court, the lawyer has
both procedural and substantive responsibilities in her role as a professional
actor on the court stage. Through her performance, the script comes alive:
without her action, law would remain abstract, rules in books, unrealized,
unlived, immaterial.
When this professional legal actor acts as an advocate in court, she plays a
dual role: as a professional, she always acts according to the law, rules, ethics
and norms that define legal discourse; meanwhile, within those bounds, she
manifests the legal interests of the party whom she represents. The characters’
substantive speeches are planned and rehearsed but ultimately improvised by
the actors, who resemble more the classical soloists of old and jazz musicians
of today than they do actors reciting Shakespeare word for word. While the
lawyer has room to exercise her professional judgment to decide what to say
on behalf of her client as she presents his claim to the judge (and how to say
it), “professional” means that she performs these representative actions always
within the constraints set by her role as the court’s officer. To assist the court
in the administration of justice, she must be honest with the judge and not
mislead him in reporting facts to the court and rehearsing legal arguments
about the facts for the court. The court requires her to manifest the rules of
procedure, evidence, lawyering, and substantive law in good faith, and not to
manipulate them to benefit her client at the expense of the integrity of the law:
she must play fair, and not demean her profession.
Though they may seem abstract, a lawyer can detect boundaries
encompassing the court and the legal profession in her ordinary experience.
She acknowledges these boundaries, implicitly or consciously, when she uses
her legal skills and status ethically (rather than arbitrarily), and when she
speaks professionally (rather than casually). For example, she respects the
boundary when she would like to recount a privileged story about a client—but
instead says something else, and when she senses an opportunity to prevail as
an advocate by asserting something in bad faith—but then does not. If in
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either instance, she proceeds when she should refrain, (it is to be hoped that)
she senses her transgression of the boundary.
Behavior falling within these boundaries ties into the warp-lines that
support and subtend the legal profession. The mesh of our laws supports our
social fabric entire; from the courts emanate fine threads of law to mend
specific flaws. To realize individual rights and to fashion legal remedies, the
officers of courts follow layers of procedural rules, within which their actions
are fully enmeshed.
A judge and his court are so closely identified that “court” has become his
metonym. A private person who happens also to be a judge is of course a
human being and a citizen like any other—but in his office he is also, both
symbolically and effectively, something else as well: an instance of the state,
appointed to administer the law in each case brought for trial in a court of
justice. The court is both the judge’s court and the state’s court: both the
professional domain of the judge and an institution of government. As a
person vested with the state’s authority, the judge serves the state by bodying
forth the rule of law.
Thus, the presiding judge has a maieutic function: in writing his opinion
the judge treats the opposed parties, resolving their dispute by incorporating
their theses in synthesizing a new stretch of common law. This synthesis is
bound by a maieutic ethic: the judge is to bracket his personal, political
commitments and strive professionally to find, channel, or produce the law in
accordance with the procedural and substantive rules that shape legal
discourse. In the formalist limit, the same law would result from the judge’s
act of dialectical synthesis regardless of the personal identity of the writing
judge. While this limit may describe a professional ideal, legal realists note
that different judges may synthesize different threads of law—despite striving
to work properly the decisionmaking mechanisms appropriate to the discourse.
It is the judge’s strife that manifests his professionalism, his performance of a
speech act (writing his opinion) in accordance with the maieutic ethic of
representation, of re-presenting the law on the matter in his hands.
The state channels formidable power to the court to fulfill its charge of
applying the law and ruling justly. The court, in turn, appoints lawyers to
represent parties (inter alia): to manifest properly private persons whose
interests are to appear for judgment. The lawyer’s acts of representation are
examined more closely below. Clearly, lawyers are subject to the judge’s
explicit and inherent powers and are thus lower officers of the court than is the
judge. If a judge is the heart and mind of the court, then the lawyers who bring
the parties before him are its right and left hands.
The courts are faculties of the state that reach out in the form of their
lawyers to engage with and act upon individuals who seek remedies. The
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duties that attend the lawyer’s office72 include actions that constitute the state’s
engagement with individual petitioners who would move the court. These
duties are essential to the American adversarial system of justice. Even if the
history and design of our judicial system were not already to require the lawyer
to act as an officer of the court, we would need to appoint the lawyer as such to
provide and delimit the actions that manifest her clients in the system. Indeed,
when a lawyer who has not been admitted to practice before a foreign state
court seeks to represent a party before that court, she will only be admitted for
a particular performance of representation, subject to the pro hac vice rules of
the foreign court:
[O]ne of the principal purposes of the pro hac vice rules is to assure that, if a
[state court’s] lawyer is not to be present . . . the lawyer admitted pro hac vice
will be there. As such, he is an officer of [that state’s] Court, subject to control
73
of the Court to ensure the integrity of the proceeding.

Here again, we see that the lawyer is not only an officer of the court, but that
the officer is subject to the court’s power for the purpose of ensuring the
integrity of the litigation process. As a legal actor, the lawyer has both
procedural and substantive duties in the administration of justice, and is bound
to play fair. A properly socialized, disciplined lawyer can detect the ethical
boundaries of her profession, and identifying with the discourse, has
internalized its professional boundaries as her own.
Even if the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court were not well
established in the history of our profession, it would be straightforward to infer
it from both her structural situation and the functions she serves within the
institutions that call the lawyer forth and shape her behavior. Further, if the
lawyer’s role as an officer of the court were not to exist, the court would need
to create it to assist the judge in the adversarial process of justice that we use to
reweave the rifts in our social order.
B.

Weaving the Social Fabric

While in the United States federal legal system the legislature writes the
laws to which all persons within the state’s power are subject, the courts
interpret and apply the laws to specific persons’ matters. In fashioning

72. Oxford English Dictionary Online, duty, n., 1.a (2d ed. 1989) (“The action and conduct
due to a superior . . . .”); Oxford English Dictionary Online, office, n., 2.a (“A position or post to
which certain duties are attached, esp[ecially] one of a more or less public character; a position of
trust, authority, or service under constituted authority; a post in the administration of government,
the public service, the direction of a corporation, company, society, etc.”). These duties attach the
lawyer through the oath sworn by each applicant as she crosses the threshold of the profession of
law, as discussed supra Part I.C.
73. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 56 (Del. 1994)
(emphasis added).
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individual remedies from general laws, the court to some extent also makes
law. In drawing the threads of the law spun by the legislature to determine
how they bind particular people, the court often must spin a few threads of its
own.
The legislative machine weaves the social fabric on a grand scale, through
the collaboration of lawmakers who represent the collective public (and who
are lobbied by representatives from specific groups). The legislators who work
the mechanisms of the legislative machine are themselves the products of
maieutic processes. A political candidate becomes a legislator through a series
of call and response, invitation and acceptance: the candidate is called to run
by a vacancy in the institutional structure of the legislature, and his running in
turn interpellates voters; their election in turn invites him to office, to which
his taking the oath of office is an answer—in that maieutic moment, a
legislator is born. The legislator’s constituents constitute him as their
representative in government: he is their reification, their manifestation as an
actor in a legislative discourse; they are the material of which he (as a
legislator) consists. His election not only renders him the site of reified
members of the public, but it also makes him a public servant as a member of
the government. Thus, the professional acts of a Senator or Congressman are
governmental actions, as well as actions on behalf of his public constituents
who cannot otherwise reach the mechanisms of the legislative realm.
Legislators who are the products of election processes in turn complement
each other as they produce statutory law. While the laws they synthesize on
our behalf bind each of us, by necessity they are writ large: its scope
encompassing the political will of large numbers to govern the work of large
numbers, the statute is coarse cloth. A legislator performs at least two orders
of maieutic acts.
The first involves representing or channeling his
constituents’ interests as he negotiates and drafts legislation, translating his
most honest understanding of their needs and will into a text that is appropriate
for transformation into the language of a statute. The second is his vote, the
speech act that transforms a bill into law, enacting it as a statute—a text that
will in turn be read to inform social ordering, and be interpreted in the maieutic
work of a judge.
I see in Hegel’s discussion of the syllogistic process a crochet that traces a
chain of syntheses involving various kinds of syllogism (for example, the
syllogism of existence, the syllogisms of reflection, and the syllogism of
necessity) in which “[t]he different genera of the syllogism exhibit instead the
stages in the repletion or concretion”74 of their mediating terms. That is, each
“syllogism is full of content,”75 and at the maieutic moment at which a new

74. HEGEL, supra note 55, at 624 (italics omitted).
75. Id. at 617 (italics omitted).
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thread is pulled through a dialectical loop (“the completion of the syllogism”76)
the mediation sublates itself: the posited mediation has been realized or
concretized—the interpellation has been answered through a maieutic act that
posits a new site of interpellation. In the discourse of the law, this weaving,
this “movement is the sublation of this mediation”77 into the next order of
mediation that produces the fabric of social order. For example, an extant
government interpellates a new legislator from the general public through its
established mechanisms of election; the process of election culminates in the
maieutic moment in which a member of the public takes the oath of office,
crossing into the realm of the government, creating a new extant government
and reifying his constituents therein, a unification that sublates an electorate
into one representative. This newly produced government actor then
participates in a different genre of production, that of synthesizing new law
from potential manifestations in the legislative process. This legislative
production process culminates in the maieutic moment of the enactment of a
new statute, a new hard-twisted thread in the statute-cloth.
Working within these warp and weft, the court must interlace fine
filaments of legal discourse to weave out the social fabric. In that they work at
the level of the individual, individual courts more resemble cottages of
industry than factories—though collectively, their structure entails review of
the filaments they produce for uniformity with parallel filaments, and for
conformity to the pattern delineated in the Constitution and by the legislature.
In these cottages the sublime rule of law materializes. Thus, the court is the
law’s best room: it is sacred to the rule of law, and one enters the court at the
utmost of care. The bar—the demarcation that distinguishes this realm of legal
industry is so crucial to the function of the legal profession that it has become
synecdochic for the court; the boundary between the court and that which is
not properly before it is of central importance in the administration of justice.
“The bar” meant literally “the railing or ‘bar’ in a courtroom [that] separat[es]
spectators from lawyers and the judge.”78 This boundary between the court
and the laity protects the integrity of the court. Accordingly, petitions to mend
gaps or rents in the social fabric must be brought properly (as specified by
layers of rules of procedure) for the mechanisms of the court to act upon them.
Put another way, the best room houses the machinery that spins out the
rule of law; accordingly, it must be kept free of inappropriate matter that would
gum up the mechanisms, of inappropriate actions that would derange the
delicate instruments of social order. The boundary that encompasses the court
must be selectively permeable: it must allow in only information and action
that are appropriate to the court, and keep out that which would misguide it.
76. Id. at 623.
77. Id. at 624.
78. The State Bar of California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note 49.
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The gatekeepers at this boundary between the court and those who seek legal
action are the lawyers. Thus, the lawyers are professionally bound to bring
before the court only those parties whose claims are legally and ethically
appropriate for judicial action, and to present those claims only in ways that
make them fit for entry into the best room. To the extent that the gatekeeping
lawyer fails in these functions, the integrity of the court is imperiled: the rule
of law remains immaterial, as it does not materialize in the work of the court.
The judge at the court’s center issues his officers to meet those who would
appear before him. These officers are produced by the court to work at its
boundary, to engage those who seek remedies and help them materialize
properly before the court as parties to a legal action. Through these liminal
figures, individuals who seek rights are realized by the state; like heroes at a
frontier, lawyers encounter someone who has unrealized rights and brings them
into the material, performing boundary-work between public and private, law
and non-law. In the structure of the court, the lawyers are the bar—protecting
the integrity of the court’s decisions by ensuring that they are properly
founded, and thus protecting the integrity of the common law. These officers
are bound to maintain the court’s integrity in both specified and general
ways.79 Necessarily responsible to the indispensable, foundational, and thus
primary functions of the court of justice, lawyers owe a duty to the court to
represent before it a private person as a party, translating the former into the
latter. A translator assisting a witness in testifying before the court must take
“an oath or affirmation to make a true translation.”80 This legal requirement
signals and supports the fact-finder’s epistemological reliance on the witness’
testimony, which is itself made under duty and oath to testify truthfully.81 A
fortiori, the lawyer who represents or translates private concerns into public
pleadings acts under duty and oath to make a true translation: to represent the
party honestly without misleading the finder of fact.82 A lawyer whose
79. For example, lawyers must maintain the integrity of the profession, MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L. CONDUCT PART 8 (2010), and maintain candor toward the court, id. R. 3.3.
80. FED. R. EVID. 604.
81. FED. R. EVID. 603 (“Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to
testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness’s
conscience.”).
82. This duty extends beyond simply avoiding misstatements of fact or law, to avoiding
expediency, deceit, trickery, or artfulness. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West
Supp. 2012); The Lawyer’s Oath, MISSOURI B., http://members.mobar.org/pdfs/publications/
annual_report/oath.pdf (last visited May 20, 2012); Lawyer[‘]s Oath, ST. B. OF MICHIGAN,
http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/lawyersoath.cfm (last visited May 20, 2012); SOUTH
CAROLINA JUDICIAL DEP’T RULES 402(k)(3), Oath of Office for Attorneys (“I will employ for
the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me only such means as are consistent with trust
and honor and the principles of professionalism, and will never seek to mislead an opposing
party, the judge or jury by a false statement of fact or law[.]” (emphasis added)), available at
http://www.sccourts.org/courtReg/displayRule.cfm?ruleID=402&subRuleID=&ruleType=APP.
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performance fails in these duties engages in mis-representation, failing in the
very purpose for which the court created her.
So, the Constitution provides for the judge, the judge appoints the lawyer
to assist him in the administration of justice, and the lawyer represents the
party before the court. Legal representation is a complex function that operates
on a layperson to render him as a specific legal subject. The lawyer performs
this function for the court and for her client, and in doing so is engaged in
maieutic acts: she must bracket her personal interests, both in assuring the
integrity of the legal process and in manifesting the client’s position subject to
it. The officer surveys the person’s self-described situation through the lenses
of her legal training to identify aspects that could materialize as facts under a
law. Using her professional judgment, the officer operates upon the
layperson’s story, laying hands upon it, forming it into a proper disposition for
the judge’s action. By petitioning, the officer pleads for the party so that the
decisionmaker, the heart and mind of the court, may dispose of the case as
lawfully and justly as he is able. The client would not appear properly before
the court but for the professional maieutic work of the lawyer,83 who herself
could not appear in court but for the operation of the court’s authority, which
in turn flows from the Constitution. This tracing up the stream of crocheted
pregnant mediations finds the Constitution itself the product of a maieutic
process: by ratifying the Constitution, the representatives of several states
consummated the dialectical relationship in which their contradictions were
merged, sublating the states to create a new union.
The lawyer’s work in representation involves translating and coding the
client’s situation into a legally operable form, and the court’s operation
interprets a private grievance in terms of social meaning. The new social
meaning has public import, regulating relationships between people (whether
individual or organized: natural persons, corporations and states) and
allocating responsibility for their actions. For example, what is commonly
known about the dispute between Roe and Wade is not the detail of the parties’
personal situations, but the meaning of the court’s action upon their situations
for the rights of all American women.

83. It is possible for a person to represent himself before the court as a pro se litigant. Representation is still expected; that is, the person is to translate his situation into matter appropriate
for the judge to act upon, though the judge himself may try to reach out and assist him with that
complex task. Self-representation is deemed inadvisable, to the point where a court may require
and appoint a lawyer to represent the would-be pro se litigant as a party if it deems the person’s
own representation inadequate to the matter at hand. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 33–34 (1981) (declining to appoint counsel in a case of termination of parental
rights, but noting that doing so may be “[a]wise public policy,” and that at the time, “33 States
and the District of Columbia provide[d] statutorily for the appointment of counsel” in these
cases).
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In sum, the lawyer assists the court in representational, translational
boundary work, as both a gatekeeper at and a channel through a boundary that
separates the private from the public while connecting them in procedurally
prescribed ways. Through her maieutic work to present a layperson’s cause,
only particular aspects of his private concern will materialize in the public
realm of law, and those, only in prescribed forms. The private is shaped and
thus limited by its manifestation in the public realm, for the benefit of the
public’s interest in the rule of law. The major task that the lawyer does for the
court in representing a party is translating and transforming a private matter
into the public realm, rendering a personal grievance into a proper subject for
collective social action in accordance with the rule of law.
C. Harmony or Discord
The translational work of the lawyer entails its own ethics, of fidelity both
to the client’s meaning and to the integrity of the target language. The lawyer
must avoid substituting her personal meaning for that of the client, but also
must use the court’s language according to its own syntax, grammar and
semantics.
The lawyer’s act of translation engages her professional
judgment,84 which is to work in the lacunae between the client’s matter and the
court’s action to effect a proper representation of the private party to the
public.
1. The Term “Standard Conception” Was Coined To Refer to
Professional Identity Trouble.
Being on the frontier between the court and the private party, the lawyer is
a liminal figure in both realms. She attains this marginal status in performing a
function essential to the administration of justice, but its liminality has
confused analysts: though her situation makes it impossible to account for her
exclusively within only one or the other realm, many analysts attempt to locate
her in one realm while ignoring or distorting her manifestation in the other.
Then, the situation of the lawyer is framed as though the lawyer were only
either a court officer or an agent of the client—and since the client pays the
lawyer, the court-officer picture evanesces, leaving only the “standard
conception” (a term that Gerald Postema introduced to refer to a professional

84. The exercise of professional judgment contemplated by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct requires the lawyer to be honest with the client, and may “involve[] unpleasant facts and
alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
2.1 cmt. 1 (2010). As Wendel puts it, “Professionalism . . . instructs lawyers not to participate in
the hocus-pocus of turning dogs into ducks, and is therefore a principle for regulating the exercise
of interpretive judgment.” W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 1167, 1171 (2005).
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identity that, “far from encouraging the development and preservation of a
mature sense of responsibility, . . . tends seriously to undermine it.”85):

Figure 1
The Standard Conception
The archetypal statement of a lawyer’s professional identity as the agent of
a client is Lord Brougham’s Speech in Defence of Queen Caroline, in which he
asserted that a lawyer knows “but one person in the world, THAT CLIENT
AND NONE OTHER,” and that to save that client, “he must go on reckless of
the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be, to involve his country in
confusion for his client’s protection.”86 His client, Queen Caroline, had been
charged with treason; to save her from being dethroned, he was threatening to
reveal the king’s marriage to another (which disqualified the king from his
throne).87 Brougham’s statement was not simply a disquisition on the lawyer’s
role, but a performative speech act threatening his king on behalf of his queen
in a situation that could devolve into a civil war—and even this extreme
statement showed care for the opposing party and for the public, in that he did
not simply reveal the harmful information to which he alluded. Although the
circumstances of this utterance that Brougham himself described as “anything

85. Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63,
74 (1980). See supra Part I.B. regarding the necessary independence of the lawyer’s professional
judgment from the identity of her employer.
86. Henry Lord Brougham, Speech in the Case of Queen Caroline, in 1 SPEECHES OF
HENRY LORD BROUGHAM: UPON QUESTIONS RELATING TO PUBLIC RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND
INTERESTS 103, 105 (1838).
87. Id. at 88–90. Brougham himself identified this statement as a threat: “The real truth is,
that the statement was anything rather than a deliberate and well-considered opinion. It was a
menace, and it was addressed chiefly to George IV, but also to wiser men . . . .” Charles P.
Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 4 (1951) (quoting Letter from Lord Brougham
to William Forsyth[] (1859), in ELLIOT E. CHEATHAM, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 227 (1938)). Forsyth wrote in an annotation to the letter that Brougham
likely agreed with the view articulated by the Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in their presence, “that
the arms which an advocate wields he ought to use as a warrior, not as an assassin. . . . He ought
to know how to reconcile the interests of his clients with the eternal interests of Truth and
Justice.” LETTERS FROM LORD BROUGHAM TO WILLIAM FORSYTH, 41 (Wm. Forsyth ed., 1872).
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rather than a deliberate and well-considered opinion”88 were unusually
strained, and despite its obvious ulterior meaning, Brougham’s statement has
been taken up as a banner by those who would frame the lawyer merely as a
client’s agent.89 This rhetorical veil over a grave substantive threat has floated
across the sea and the centuries, touching a page now and again, its relict traces
themselves contested90—the slipping of a thread in the social fabric.
A lawyer’s tunnel-visioned focus on her status as a client’s agent can allow
her to forget that she is available to the client only as an officer of the court. If
her zeal for the client is not balanced by her duties to the court, she risks
disserving the client by malfunctioning as a court officer. Overzeal backfire is
a genre of malpractice,91 the most aggravated symptoms of which include
misrepresentation and the capture of legal procedures for improper purposes.92
Some jurisdictions have been troubled by the potential for lawyers willfully to
misinterpret “zeal” in client representation, and therefore have dropped the
term from their professional codes.93 Even Massachusetts and the District of

88. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, “Anything Rather Than a Deliberate and WellConsidered Opinion”—Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1221, 1222 (2006) (quoting Letter from Lord Brougham to William Forsyth (1859), in WILLIAM
FORSYTH, THE HISTORY OF LAWYERS ANCIENT AND MODERN 380 n.1 (1875)).
89. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 68, at 1244 (describing Brougham’s statement as “the
classic vindication of the lawyer’s partisan role”); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 7, 257 n.11 (2008).
90. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1213 (2006); Zacharias & Green, supra note 88; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A.
Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2005) (reporting midto-late-nineteenth century debates such as that noted in Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845)
(“It is a popular, but gross mistake, to suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity to any one except
his client; and that the latter is the keeper of his professional conscience.”)); John Leubsdorf,
Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 124 (1995) (“The
inescapable reality is that every lawyer is at the center of a web” of relationships.).
91. Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 120 (“[I]mprudent overzealousness [is] likely to backfire
against the client.”).
92. Id. at 127–28 (“The main exceptions in tort law to the rule of lawyer nonliability to
opposing litigants are intentional misrepresentation and the use of inappropriate process for an
improper purpose.” (footnote omitted)).
93. See, e.g., ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 Reporter’s Notes (2008), available at
http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebar_overseers_bar_rules&id=87826&
v=article (“The Task Force determined that the term ‘zeal’ was often used as a cover for a
lawyer’s inappropriate behavior. Moreover, the Task Force thought the term was not needed to
describe a lawyer’s ethical duties. Accordingly, the Task Force recommended its deletion.”);
OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, Comparison to ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (2007) available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfCon
duct/profConductRules.pdf (“Zealous advocacy is often invoked as an excuse for unprofessional
behavior.”); Comparison of Newly Adopted Washington Rules of Professional Conduct with ABA
Model Rules, AM. B. ASS’N (Aug. 2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/mi
grated/cpr/pic/washington.pdf (“replaces ‘zealously’ with ‘conscientiously and ardently’”);
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Columbia, which affirmatively call for a lawyer to represent a client
“zealously,” qualify the urge for zeal with, “within the bounds of the law.”94
Anita Bernstein calls this qualification a “prissy tag-along caution”95 though
she nonetheless suggests that it be retained.96 Bernstein’s thesis is that a
lawyer’s practice “is marred at least as much by a shortage as a surplus of zeal
in advocacy on behalf of clients[.]”97 Ultimately, however, Bernstein is one of
many commentators who see zealous advocacy as part of the lawyer’s
professional identity—but take care to distinguish “zeal” as a favored quality
from “zealotry” or excessive zeal, a disparagement.98 Determining how to
make this distinction between zeal and excessive zeal requires the lawyer to
exercise her professional judgment, and is part of the lawyer’s work in crafting
her professional identity.
2. Discord: The Double Bind
The lawyer drawing this boundary might experience her situation as a
convergence of conflicting interests.99 She has been called forth by the court
to serve as its officer, and thus is bound to serve in the administration of

STATE BAR OF ARIZ., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONALISM 15 (Mar. 21, 2005),
available at http://www.azbar.org/media/64636/professionalism%20task%20force.pdf (listing
“zeal” as a “cause[] of unprofessional behavior”); Arthur J. Lachman & Peter R. Jarvis, Zeal in
Client Representation - FAQs, 2005 PROF. LAW. 81, 83–84 (summarizing as of 2005, but noting
that the District of Columbia and Massachusetts both added “zealously” to their adopted versions
of Model Rule 1.3). Model Rule 1.3 is titled “Diligence,” and provides that “[a] lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2010).
94. MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/
obcbbo/rpc1.htm#Rule%201.3; D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007), available at
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/rules_of_professional_conduct/amended_ru
les/rule_one/rule01_03.cfm.
95. Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1166 (2006).
96. Id. at 1189.
97. Id., though Bernstein also notes that, “Zealous advocacy does not comport with the
lawyer as transportation vehicle or lunch counter, passively meeting the felt needs of a customer
and exercising no discretion.” Id. at 1197.
98. See, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 6.2, at 6-4 (3d ed., Supp. 2003) (“[L]awyers have never had a special dispensation
to aid a client’s cause through unethical or unlawful means, and Model Rule 1.3 hardly provides
one. To the contrary, zealous representation must be within the bounds of the law in order to pass
muster . . . .”); Lachman & Jarvis, supra note 93, at 81 (“Nowhere in any ethical rule or
commentary is it even suggested that ‘zealotry,’ as opposed to ‘zeal,’ is an appropriate standard of
lawyer conduct.”).
99. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12
(1988) (“The real dispute” is about how and how much lawyers “should consider attending to the
[legal] framework’s integrity as one of their professional responsibilities. This is obviously an
important dispute.”).
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justice. She also has been retained by her client to plead on his behalf, to
advocate for his cause (arguably, zealously), and thus is bound to protect his
confidences and to act as his agent in representing him to the court. As we
have seen, this perceived conflict ostensibly may be resolved by denying a
troubling source of obligation—ignoring the interpellations of one of her
discursive situations so that the lawyer is left with only one identity that
matters. This is how the “standard conception” of the lawyer comes about.
When her manifestation within one of her professional realms is forgotten,
the lawyer’s professional identity begins to dis-integrate. To prevent this, it
becomes all the more important to focus on the lawyer’s evanescent
embodiment. But even when both situations of the lawyer are acknowledged,
there nonetheless remains the idea of a double bind that pulls the lawyer into
either one realm or the other:

Figure 2
The Double-Bind
The professional identity crisis over whether a lawyer is primarily a
zealous advocate or an officer of the court is pervasive, manifesting in other
legal contexts as well in litigation: lawyers who hold licenses but do not appear
in court nonetheless remain subject to the court’s regulation (and sometimes
also to that of other administrative bodies), and legal counseling occurs with an
awareness of the law and the potential for litigation, regulation and sanctions.
For example, transactional lawyers are subject to rules of fairness and ethics in
negotiation, and their transactions are subject to the securities laws. The
lawyer has affirmative duties to decline to sign and file with the Securities
Exchange Commission a client corporation’s misleading public disclosures,100
much as a litigator has affirmative duties to sign and file with the court only
papers that are submitted for proper purposes, warranted by law and supported
by evidence.101 Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002102 required the
Securities Exchange Commission to issue rules that, like the various courts’
rules of professional conduct, articulate aspects of a minimum standard for the
professional conduct of a lawyer practicing before the agency. The rules were

100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).
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to require the lawyer to report “evidence of a material violation of securities
law” by a corporate client to the client’s chief legal counsel or CEO, and if the
officer “does not appropriately respond to the evidence[,]” then to the board of
directors.103 In articulating the duty of a lawyer representing an issuer before
the SEC to make these reports, the promulgated rules further establish that by
making such a report, “an attorney does not reveal client confidences or secrets
or privileged or otherwise protected information related to the attorney’s
representation of an issuer,”104 and that without the client’s consent, the lawyer
“may reveal to the Commission . . . confidential information related to the
representation to the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary” to
prevent or rectify a client’s violation of the law under certain circumstances, or
to prevent the client from committing or suborning perjury, or from
“committing any act . . . that is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon the
Commission[.]”105
Lawyers who counsel a client in other contexts also socialize the client to
the legal system. For example, in the patent context the lawyer’s duties as an
officer of the court may require her to counsel the client against filing a patent
application to cover an obvious “invention” (the obvious is not legally
patentable,106 so applying for a patent on the obvious either wastes legal
resources if the application properly fails, or diverts the patent system from its
Constitutional goals if the application improperly succeeds). Or, in the context
of community lawyering, the lawyer’s duties as an officer of the court may
require her to counsel the client to negotiate rather than to litigate—to avoid
seeking judicial resources when Constitutional goals would be better served by
other means.107

103. Id.
104. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).
105. Id. § 205.3(d)(2).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
107. Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer’s Duty To Work
for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901, 932 (1995) (arguing that not only community
lawyers, but any lawyer with a case involving race relations “can counsel clients in the interest of
racial harmony”):
Lawyers also have heightened access to the power structure, including the power to shape
both policy and law. Lawyers’ ability to win legal rights for racial and ethnic minorities,
as well as their involvement when the legal interests of these groups clash, give them the
capability to create positive and negative effects. Lawyers can either defuse racial and
ethnic tension and build bridges between communities or intensify social divisions
depending on how they handle each case. Lawyers must be aware of this potential and
think through the consequences of their lawyering choices as well as the choices of their
clients.
Id. at 931.
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These examples all demonstrate that the lawyer is not only an officer of the
court when she is engaged in litigation—she is always already an officer of the
court, and acts as such whenever she performs as a professional.
Though these obligations are characteristic of the lawyer’s pressing duties
as an officer of the court, commentators who perceived that the transactional
lawyer’s duty to report evidence indicated not only a counseling but moreover
a gatekeeping role for the lawyer controverted the latter role: some objected to
its interference with the lawyer’s role as a client advocate, while others viewed
it as a matter of course for the lawyer as an officer of the court.108
3. Harmony: The Coherence of the Lawyer’s Professional Identity
The lawyer is in a double bind: the officer of the court representing a client
is enmeshed in a dual role, and may experience role strain109 if these ties
diverge. However, the lawyer’s dual enmeshment problem eases in light of the
present discussion. It is clear that the lawyer would not even be present to
represent the client were the court not creating and maintaining her. Thus, the
lawyer’s original, persistent and primary duty is to the court, to function as its
officer in the administration of justice; any other roles depend upon—hang
upon, are subordinate to—her role as the court’s functionary. In other words,
the lawyer’s role as the client’s representative exists to help the court function
in its administration of justice, so that the representative functions that the
lawyer performs to help the client are circumscribed and subtended by her
role as an officer of the court.
108. See, e.g., Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 138889 nn.2-5 (2004) (collecting citations); id. at 1389 (arguing the “simple, and ultimately
uncontroversial, point [that l]awyers are gatekeepers and always have been” (footnote omitted));
Wendel, supra note 84, at 1179 & n.38 (“The services of gatekeepers, such as transactional
lawyers and auditing firms, signal to the market that the client’s representations are fair and
accurate.”) (collecting citations); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for
the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003); Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke,
The Ethical Obligation of Transactional Lawyers To Act As Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9
(2003).
Some criticism of the lawyer’s gatekeeping role is leveled at its purported conflation of
the lawyer’s function with that of the judge. In another context, William Simon succinctly
articulates a distinction between the lawyer and the judge as gatekeepers. See William H. Simon,
Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A Critique of Some Academic Perspectives, 23 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 987, 1000 (2010) (“The lawyer’s role, of course, is different from the judge’s.
The judge’s decisions are typically dispositive; the lawyer’s are typically facilitative.”).
The gatekeeping role of the government lawyer similarly has been debated. See
Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951 (1991) (collecting citations).
109. William J. Goode, A Theory of Role Strain, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 483 (1960) (The difficulty
of fulfilling the demands of multiple roles results in the subject’s role-bargaining—reducing her
overall role strain by allocating her efforts to perform well among all of her role relationships.
Thus, she will perform better in some roles at the expense of others.).
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The lawyer both works within the court and directly engages the private
party in a critical, interstitial realm that contacts the public and private spheres.
In this interstice the lawyer must exercise her independent professional
judgment110 to effect a proper translational connection between the two.111
The Supreme Court has recognized this professional realm in which the
lawyer’s roles converge, and explicitly relied on her functions of promoting
justice in the court and the legal system as its basis for creating the workproduct doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor.112
This interstitial realm is also the “empty stage” at the core of the lawyer’s
job as envisioned by Robert Gordon.113 The stage is empty in that the exercise
of professional judgment is necessarily “incompletely specified, or
underdetermined by rules and standards”114: the coarse statute cloth must be
elaborated by the common law, and so the lawyer draws thread for the judge.
At the edge of the law, where rules fall silent, the lawyer searches her
professional soul for the ethics and norms of her formative socialization, and as
she decides how to perform her job, she further forms herself as a lawyer.
The disharmony of the double-bind can be resolved: as the role-structure
diagrammed in Figure 3 is realized, the lawyer’s professional identity coheres.
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010) (“In representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.” (emphasis added)).
Note also the professional judgments required by FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See also Postema, supra
note 85, at 68.
111. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 WISC. L. REV. 29, 112 (“[T]he task for which the lawyer’s role was created in the
first place, [is] the reconciliation of public and private ends.”).
112. 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947):
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the
advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In
performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain
degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.
Proper preparation of a client’s case demands that he assemble information, sift what he
considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan
his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and the
necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence
to promote justice and to protect their clients’ interests.
113. Gordon, supra note 99, at 8.
114. Wendel, supra note 84, at 1195; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Counseling, in
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., et al., Symposium: Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP.
L. REV. 591, 608 (2003) (footnote omitted):
As officers of the court and gatekeepers in imperfect regulatory processes, lawyers have
obligations that transcend those owed to any particular client. Honesty, trust, and fairness
are collective goods; neither legal nor market systems can function effectively if lawyers
lack a basic sense of social responsibility for the consequences of their professional acts.
To Simon’s observation that there is no consensus about where to draw line between the lawyer
as advocate and as officer of the court, I respond that such a consensus would crowd the empty
stage on which this line-drawing is part of the lawyer’s boundary work.
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The dual roles of the lawyer as both an officer of the court and counsel render
her a specific kind of court officer who translates between the realms of the
court and the private party, and thus exists simultaneously in both.

Figure 3
Role-Coherence and Integrity of Identity for the Lawyer
Consider the coherence of the lawyer’s roles as she assists the court in
weaving the social fabric: her client’s thread pulls toward his private interests.
As he becomes wrapped up in his private concerns, his focus foregrounds his
side of the story that will be performed for the judge; he backgrounds his
interests in the rule of law as a member of the public, relying (implicitly or
consciously) on the integrity of the justice system to attend to his public
interests.
Part of the lawyer’s work in translating her client’s interests into claims
before the court is to screen appropriate matter for judicial consideration from
inappropriate matter. The screens that the lawyer applies comprise laws, rules,
ethics, norms and any other professional expectations that contribute to
procedural integrity (i.e., following the procedures meticulously) and fairness
(e.g., scrupulously avoiding mis-representation to the court, and dealing fairly
with the other side)—Constitutional values that the lawyer has sworn to
uphold. Indeed, the court’s procedural integrity flows from our Constitutional
commitment to “fair play and substantial justice,”115 so that the lawyer’s sworn
duty to uphold the Constitution entails duties to adhere firmly to established
judicial procedures and to conform to legal ethics as she presents the client to
the court.116 Through the lawyer’s professional performance that conforms to
the maieutic ethic, the client manifests as a party with justiciable claims.

115. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal.,
480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987).
116. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (2010) (“This Rule sets
forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the
integrity of the adjudicative process.”).
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If the lawyer uncritically lends her skillful hands and—with her feet firmly
anchored in the court—simply pulls for her client, the social fabric will strain.
If this is what lawyers should do, then we must multiply these strains (or
combine them with a power law) across all of the diverging interests of clients,
and the social fabric will tangle about arbitrary, irreconcilable lines. Reciting
the fact that the client pays the lawyer for her services, some imagine the
lawyer to be primarily or exclusively an agent who is trained to work the legal
system to obtain benefits for her private client. But the lawyer’s fee, which is
required by law to be reasonable,117 is properly for the lawyer to perform her
dual role as an officer of the court representing the client professionally—the
lawyer’s performance is to conform to the rules, ethics, morals, norms, and
other standards that sustain the rule of law. That the fee is not to be
unreasonably high signals that it is not to include a bribe to throw the game in
the client’s favor.
The lawyer’s commitment to the Constitution (to the rule of law) is a
commitment to restrain and direct the exercise of arbitrary power.118 This
commitment entails helping the judge to reconcile the client’s thread with the
broader social fabric, harmonizing individual interests with the law of the land.
To administer justice is to weave out gaps in the law and to mend rent fabric.
This work looks not only to the threads at hand, but to the pattern that will
persist beyond any particular client or matter.
Though the judge does the knitting, the lawyer is not free to run with a
yarn, unraveling the court’s work. The dispute before the judge is framed in
terms of two opposed sides, each of whose evidence and arguments are to be
equally well represented. The material facts presented to the court should be
as accurate and complete as reasonably possible, save for those submerged by
ethically asserted privileges, which are narrowly construed precisely because
they obscure material facts from the court’s view. The lawyer is committed to
ensuring that the court has what it needs to resolve the dispute fairly. If the
lawyer fails in this commitment, she is subject to sanction.119
4. The Big Picture
Thinking through the lawyer’s structural position and functions with
respect to the court and the legal system results in an understanding of her

117. See, e.g., Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel.Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2010).
118. Oxford English Dictionary Online, rule, n., 4.c (2d ed. 1989) (“rule of law: . . . (b) with
the: a doctrine, deriving from theories of natural law, that in order to control the exercise of
arbitrary power, the latter must be subordinated to impartial and well-defined principles of law;
(c) with the: spec. in English law, the concept that the day-to-day exercise of executive power
must conform to general principles as administered by the ordinary courts.”).
119. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g); FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
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discursive situation (identity), and also her role-structure, that can be
diagrammed as in Fig. 3 and further contextualized as in Fig. 4.

Figure 4
Ordering the Lawyers’ Roles
In her service to the court, the lawyer extends from the court to the client,
sifting the situation presented to her for issues that are proper for treatment by
the court, and translating those issues for expression to the court in a form that
assists (and does not thwart) the court’s operation. The process of legal
representation is thus selective in those aspects of the client that will manifest
in court, and the means and ends of their manifestation are limited, specified,
and shaped by legal, ethical and normative requirements. The officer of the
court renders the party presentable to the court, and her rendition must conform
to its requisites.
In her service to the client, the lawyer counsels the client as to how his
situation maps into the law. She may advise the client as to the legality of
various possible courses of action, but may only assist the client in those that
conform to the law and legal ethics.120 The court provides the lawyer’s
privilege to represent a client before it subject to the duties discussed above;
thus, only within the realm bounded by those layers of duty is the lawyer
permitted to advocate for the client to the best of her professional skill. Only
through the lawyer’s manifestation as an officer of the court may the client’s
manifestation as a party before the court be realized.
Thus, in our adversary system of justice, the lawyer’s duty to manifest
client interests before the court is a service performed for both the court and
the client. Individual client interests may be represented as threads in the
fabric; the work of social ordering under the law is to assure that their
manifestation in it is harmonious: that the result of litigation is fair to the
instant parties, and that it does not distort of the fabric of justice when it is
generalized to all those similarly situated. This work is not merely abstract,
but is actually accomplished by professionals—keepers of the cloth—including

120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2010).
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lawyers who represent client interests to the court and subject them to its
decisions. This work does not merely preserve the law, because the law is
dynamic: the fabric billows and ripples in social currents—but wherever its
line is drawn, it bears the sway. This work preserves the rule of law by
manifesting it ever over in new ties around each new conflict, aligning private
interests with the public’s interests in the rule of law.
III. FORGETTING WHY WE ARE HERE
Nonetheless, some commentators dismiss the enabling dimension of the
lawyer, or subordinate it to the lawyer’s role as the client’s advocate.121 For
example, James Cohen argues that the term “officer of the court” is “mostly
rhetoric, caused by self-love and self-promotion”122—the costume of a
charlatan, rather than the dress of a professional.
Cohen asserts that scholarship in legal ethics has ignored agency law
(though he cites several counterexamples)123 and that applying its framework
reveals that the lawyer is an agent of the client. He claims that to accept the
argument that the idea that “the lawyer’s duty to seek justice is superior to the
obligation of loyalty and zealous advocacy on behalf of the client” entails a
“profound[] change [in] the attorney’s role from that of agent for a client to
that of agent for ‘justice.’”124 Cohen’s attempt to dismiss the officer of the
court with a wave of the wand of agency law fails illustratively, modeling an
extreme view of the standard conception.
Cohen asserts that a lawyer owes “virtually no significant duty” to the
court that both overrides her duty to the client and is distinct from the duties of

121. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); James A. Cohen, Lawyer
Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the Court,” 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349 (2000)
(and citations therein).
122. Cohen, supra note 121, at 360:
In fact, the notion that the attorney has a meaningful and distinct role as an “officer
of the court” is largely an illusion caused by self-love and self-promotion. “Careful
analysis of the role of the lawyer within the adversarial legal system reveals the
characterization to be vacuous and unduly self-laudatory. It confuses lawyers and
misleads the public.” The perpetuation of the lawyer role as an “officer of the court” by
the profession is tantamount to a charade.
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 39, 39 (1989) and citing same at 44–45). As discussed infra, Gaetke offered a heavily
pruned image of the lawyer’s responsibilities as a court officer to argue that the court should
require more of lawyers, or else lawyers should give up the title—put up or shut up, as it were.
Cohen selects only the truncated picture, and then argues that it is complete.
123. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 121, at 388; see also Wendel, supra note 84, at 1168 (“[A]
lawyer is not simply an agent of her client (although the lawyer-client relationship is obviously
governed by the law of agency).”).
124. Cohen, supra note 121, at 349–50 (emphasis added).
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non-lawyers to obey the law.125 The refrain of this argument is that a lawyer
owes to the court “no substantive duty to seek justice[.]”126
Acknowledging that the lawyer’s role as the client’s agent is limited in that
the lawyer is to obey only the client’s lawful instructions, Cohen then asserts
that because everyone is bound by the law, lawyers owe no distinctive duties to
the court. Cohen apparently adopts this approach from an article in which
Eugene Gaetke defines the lawyer’s duties as a court officer artificially
narrowly to exclude all of the officer’s duties that apply also to “laymen
participating in the legal process.”127 For example, Gaetke notes that under
Canon 7 of the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional
Responsibility—which requires a lawyer to “represent a client zealously within
the bounds of the law”128—a lawyer cannot unlawfully conceal evidence or
information, cannot knowingly use perjured testimony or make or use false
evidence or statements, and can neither assist a client in illegal or fraudulent
conduct nor knowingly engage in it. Gaetke does not regard these as a
lawyer’s duties as an officer of the court because they apply to non-lawyers as
well.
This analytical move is a misstep, in that the Code does not simply
reproduce all of the law that applies to everyone. Instead, it emphasizes those
aspects of the law that bind the lawyer in particular qua officer of the court:
Because of his position in society, even minor violations of law by a lawyer
may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession. Obedience to law
exemplifies respect for law. To lawyers especially, respect for the law should
129
be more than a platitude.

Precisely because the lawyer is an officer of the court on whom the judge
and the public rely for her function in the administration of justice, “A lawyer
shall not . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation,” nor “[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”130 As Geoffrey Hazard notes, it is “the norm of
candor to the court on which the legitimacy of the advocate’s role depends.”131
Further, a lawyer could be disciplined for unprofessional conduct without
having violated the law.
These and the other requirements that Gaetke’s analysis dismisses are
articulated in the Code’s Disciplinary Rules, which he focuses on because they

125. Id. at 408.
126. Id. at 405 & passim (e.g., 349–52, 355–88, 409).
127. Gaetke, supra note 122, at 49.
128. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983).
129. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1983).
130. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(4), (5) (1983) (italics added). A
lawyer’s compliance with the Disciplinary Rules is mandatory.
131. Hazard, supra note 68, at 1261.
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represent minimal standards for a lawyer’s conduct.132 Gaetke ignores the
Code’s recommendations and goals for lawyer conduct, further cutting the
lawyer’s identity as an officer of the court too close by including in its
definition only the court’s requirements that “compel[] conduct by a lawyer
that subordinates the interests of the client and the lawyer to those of the
judicial system or the public[.]”133 This attempt to exclude from the lawyer’s
official duties all of those that do not subordinate lawyer and client interests to
judicial or public interests misconceives the role of the lawyer, rather absurdly
relieving the officer of the court of all but a few of a long list of explicitly
enumerated duties. Gaetke implicitly frames the lawyer’s relation to the
judicial system as in Fig. 2 rather than in Fig. 3, then draws a vertical centerline through Fig. 2 and cabins the client and lawyer together on a “private” side
that stands in opposition to the court on the “public” side. The overpruning
effects of this analysis that belittle the Code reveal Fig. 2 as a Picassoesque
vision of the officer of the court. A more empirical view of the Code as
evidence of the lawyer’s duties134 supports the view of Fig. 3.
Ironically, Gaetke’s goal in interpreting the lawyer’s role as an officer of
the court so narrowly is to argue for its expansion. He challenges the legal
profession to use it or lose it—to require lawyers on pain of disciplinary action:
to provide representation pro bono; to alert the court to adverse facts as well as
adverse law, to information that protects the innocent, and to lawyer
misconduct; and thus to “give meaning to the role of officer of the court.”135
However a lawyer may feel about the proposed expansion of the duties of the
officer of the court, Gaetke need not have artificially narrowed her role to offer
them; this strategic choice suggests that he thought his argument insufficiently
forceful otherwise. Unfortunately, this rhetorical move clouds our vision of
the lawyer as an officer of the court, attenuating her manifestation as such,
subordinating and helping us to forget her professional identity.136 Gaetke’s
strategy backfires, contributing to the evanescence of the officer-of-the-court
132. Gaetke, supra note 122, at n.61. But see MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY,
Preliminary Statement (1983) (“The Code is designed to be adopted by appropriate agencies both
as an inspirational guide to the members of the profession and as a basis for disciplinary action
when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the required minimum standards stated in the
Disciplinary Rules.” (emphasis added)).
133. Gaetke, supra note 122, at 49 (emphasis added).
134. Hazard, supra note 68, at 1250 (regarding the American Bar Association’s 1908 Canons,
which preceded the Code: “[T]he Canons functioned not as enforceable legal standards but only
as evidence of such standards.”).
135. Gaetke, supra note 122, at 91.
136. For example, Cohen cites Gaetke in support of his statement that the lawyer as an officer
of the court is illusory, see Cohen, supra note 121; Deborah Rhode cites Gaetke’s limiting
characterization of the lawyer’s duties in recommending that the bar “give greater practical
content to professional aspirations,” Deborah L. Rhode, The Future of the Legal Profession:
Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 668, 708, 736 (1994).
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role that he tries to strengthen, instead leaving us with the troubling “standard
conception” of Fig. 1.
Taking Gaetke’s overpruning analysis further, Cohen identifies but “one
duty” of the lawyer that is inconsistent with his thesis: a litigating lawyer must
cite legal authority that is directly adverse to his client’s position.137 He
downplays the importance of this clear and significant example of a lawyer’s
duty to the court, which in his view, conflicts with her duty to the client: “even
if one concludes that this is a special obligation to the court not imposed on
non-lawyers and inconsistent with the duty of loyalty to the client, its practical
consequences are few.”138 From this dismissively framed admission, he
immediately concludes that:
In the end, the one duty to the court imposed on lawyers inconsistent with
the duty of loyalty to the client is the duty under the Rules to cite directly
adverse authority. The characterization officer of the court is based on little
more than self-serving rhetoric and does not include a substantive duty to seek
justice that is at odds with the duty of loyalty and zealous advocacy. A lawyer
does not owe the court any duty of consequence greater than [that of] the non139
lawyer.

From the admission that lawyers must perform a duty to the court that (as
he sees it) is inconsistent with her duty to the client, it does not follow that the
lawyer is not meaningfully an officer of the court—quite the contrary. This
duty is significant, and fits well within the role-structure discussed above: the
lawyer’s primary duties are to uphold the Constitution as an officer of the court
of justice that admitted her; her duties to the court may include representing a
client in litigation (re-presenting or translating the client’s concerns into the
pleadings and motions of a party before the court); and her professional work
serves first the court and accordingly the client, to whom she owes duties
concerning the quality of her representation. Her duties to the client are
circumscribed by her duties to the court, as depicted in Fig. 3.
Viewing the lawyer as the client’s agent, Cohen concludes that she is
nothing else. But Hazard sees the lawyer as an agent of the client without
making this mistake. Though Hazard goes so far as to say that without the
client there is no lawyer,140 he nonetheless recognizes that lawyers effect or
137. Cohen, supra note 121, at 387.
138. Id. (footnote omitted). Cohen further remarks in a footnote that arguably, “this rule is
bad and should be disregarded,” because a lawyer need not disclose facts that are adverse to the
client’s position, “which—if the goal were really justice-seeking as opposed to judicial facesaving—might also be required.” Id. at 387 n.198.
139. Id. at 387.
140. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law Practice and the Limits of Moral Philosophy, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 75, 79–80 (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 2000) (“The distinctive feature of a ‘lawyer’ is that agency is definitional in the role.
To speak of a lawyer without a client . . . does not describe a lawyer.”).
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realize141 procedure: “Lawyers as advocates effectuate the right to be heard by
providing the judge with plausible alternatives concerning the law and the
facts. (An advocate who provides an implausible alternative has failed in her
preliminary responsibility to refrain from ‘frivolous’ contentions . . . .)”.142
Hazard’s description is consistent with Fig. 3: through her actions in
representing the client in court, the lawyer manifests due process values in
accordance with her preliminary or prior responsibilities to the court. But read
in light of Fig. 3, “preliminary” indicates that the court—not the client—is the
sine qua non of the lawyer: the hands of the court are always already open to
represent the client, even when the hands are idle because no client is yet
engaged.
Hazard finds the application of moral (or ethical143) philosophy to the
practice of law troubled in that moral philosophy works in universals, while
legal practice is situational. Accordingly, he discusses Hilary Putnam’s
concern that it may be unreasonable for a person striving to perform ethically
to make the Kantian calculation of what the effects of her actions would be if
they were multiplied across those similarly (but not identically) situated.144
Putnam offers the example of someone choosing whether to care for an aging
parent or to enlist in the army in wartime to point out that a significant part of
the difficulty of this choice inheres in its being a choice of identity: the choice
does not simply flow from, but will determine who, the chooser is.145 As
Hazard interprets this concern:
His observation that the actor needs to decide who he “is” refers, I think, to the
existentialist proposition that a course of action chosen, as distinct from merely
hypothesized, effects a transformation of the actor himself. Hence, in choosing
146
a course of action the actor is redefining himself.

Consider further the lawyer’s professional choices in relation to her
identity. The lawyer is critically situated within the structure of legal
discourse, at a point where it meets a private person who would appear before
a court. In choosing to become a lawyer, a person identifies herself with and
through the court. In choosing to take on a client, the lawyer identifies herself
as the client’s representative. As William Simon points out,
Even where they think of themselves as merely providing information for
clients to integrate into their own decisions, lawyers influence clients by

141. Oxford English Dictionary Online, effectuate, v. (Draft Revision, Dec. 2008).
142. Hazard, supra note 140, at 81–82 (emphasis on “implausible” retained; emphasis on
“preliminary” added).
143. Id. at 91 n.1.
144. Id. at 78.
145. HILARY PUTNAM, RENEWING PHILOSOPHY 190–91 (1992).
146. Hazard, supra note 140, at 78 (italics retained).
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making judgments, conscious or not, about what information to present, how to
147
order it, what to emphasize, and what style and phrasing to adopt.

Further, “in this process the lawyer inescapably exercises power over the
client[,]” the responsibilities of which can be “emotionally overwhelming.”148
In a sense, by realizing procedure through her professional performance,
the lawyer continues the court’s work of manifesting herself as its officer.
Here again we see the maieutic logic of the Hegelian crochet, the chain of
syntheses in which one maieutic moment begets another: the applicant to the
bar swears the lawyer’s oath and becomes a lawyer; the lawyer effects
procedure, making representations to the court under her certification149 and
through them materializes the client properly before the court.150 A lawyer
choosing to act professionally identifies herself as an officer of the court,
whereas one who fails to act professionally disowns the court. In realizing
procedure, the lawyer has choices to make: she exercises her professional
judgment to determine how to act as an officer of the court upon her client’s
matter—how to be a lawyer.
David Luban explores how the stakes for a lawyer’s self-concept can be
high when she exercises her professional judgment, and how her judgment can
be shaped and compromised by the supervisors and colleagues with whom she
practices:
Every
document
discovery
excluding

litigation associate goes through a rite of passage: she finds a
that seemingly lies squarely within the scope of a legitimate
request, but her supervisor tells her to devise an argument for
it. . . . It is the moment when withholding information despite an

147. William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, in ETHICS
PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 140, at 165,
168–69.
148. Id. at 175.
149. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) requires a lawyer making representations to the
court to certify that the representations are not “presented for any improper purpose,” FED. R.
CIV. P. 11(b)(1), that their “legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law[,]” FED.
R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), that their factual contentions have or will likely have evidentiary support,
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3), and that any “denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or . . . reasonably based on belief or a lack of information,” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(4).
This Rule requires representations to the court to have a basis in empiricism and reason, and not
to be arbitrary.
150. “Certification” is synonymous with “oath”: see Oxford English Dictionary Online,
certify, v., 1 (2d ed. 1989); Oxford English Dictionary Online, attest, v., 1.b (2d ed. 1989). See
also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486 (1978) (“[A]ttorneys are officers of the court, and
‘when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are
virtually made under oath.’” (citation omitted)).
IN
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adversary’s legitimate request starts to feel like zealous advocacy rather than
151
deception.

Luban is describing a socialization process in which a new lawyer’s sense
of the boundary that identifies her with the court152 is confounded; eventually
she may lose her ability to realize when she is transgressing that boundary.
Thus, she begins to identify too closely with the client (or with the law firm
that has been captured by the client), and to forget her identity with the court
that deems her its officer.
Hazard points out the philosophical significance of the situationalism of
law practice. Luban then presses on to its psychological significance for the
lawyer: “Cognitive dissonance theory teaches that when our actions conflict
with our self-concept, our beliefs and attitudes change until the conflict is
removed.”153 Analyzing the Milgram experiments on wrongful obedience154
and the situation in Berkey v. Eastman Kodak Co.155, Luban suggests that there
is a slippery slope from zealous advocacy to deception that is paved with good
intentions: a lawyer senses how to perform ethically, but is expected by her
supervisors and colleagues to stretch the bounds of ethical behavior (“[L]ike
any other piece of elastic, the no-deception principle loses its grip if it is
stretched too often”156). As she tries to meet their expectations and reconcile
them with her understanding of professional performance—in the process of
her socialization as a practicing lawyer—that understanding is compromised:
she reduces the cognitive dissonance between that understanding and her
action by changing the understanding until the conflict is removed. “In other
words, our judgment gets corrupted because only by corrupting our judgment
can we continue to think well of ourselves. Conscience must be seduced into
flattering our self-image.”157
This is an individual lawyer’s psychological path into the troubled standard
conception of Fig. 1: the lawyer’s identity as an officer of the court evanesces
through her actions that are dissonant or inconsistent with it, and she forgets
whence she came to practice. In such situations the identity of the lawyer as a
zealous advocate is unduly self-laudatory and confusing to the lawyer: it

151. David J. Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 140, at 94, 106.
152. Described supra Part II.A.
153. Luban, supra note 151, at 102.
154. Id. at 97 (summarizing Stanley Milgram’s findings thus: “Two out of three people you
pass in the street would electrocute you if a laboratory technician ordered them to.”).
155. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). In the course of this
litigation, a prominent lawyer representing Kodak lied and committed perjury to conceal
documents that he later produced. The lawyer’s associate incredulously witnessed his
supervisor’s perjury, but did not report it to the court.
156. Luban, supra note 151, at 106.
157. Id. at 110–11.
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compromises her integrity as a court officer. The lawyer’s professional
judgment must be independent of such corruption, for the court and the rule of
law rely upon it. As Luban suggests, such independence is possible.158
The view that frames lawyers as agents of autonomous clients relieves the
lawyer of responsibilities that (Simon notes) can be emotionally
overwhelming—it situates the lawyer as a Milgram compliant (per Luban) who
need not answer for harm that she channels from the client to the judicial
system in obeying the client. For example, in describing the findings of the
Ethics: Beyond the Rules Task Force of the American Bar Association, Gordon
reports that in interviews, large-firm litigators made comments such as: “If
clients are going to lie to me, they are going to lie to me; am I going to try to
be a mind-reader? . . . I would hope they would be honest with me; it’s not my
responsibility to guide them to decision.”159 At a minimum, this comment
forgets or ignores the mandates of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) and
Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,160 which require a
lawyer to certify that to the best of her knowledge after conducting a
reasonable inquiry, representations to the court have evidentiary support.
Forgotten as well are the mandates of the Code’s Disciplinary Rule on lawyer
misconduct: “A lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”161 Gordon’s description of the interview
process displays cognitive-dissonance reduction at work:
While speaking in this “official” mode, our lawyer-informants treated the
actual stories we used of ethically problematic conduct (usually involving
suppression or concealment of relevant evidence in discovery) by large-firm
lawyers as either not really raising ethical problems at all or else as isolated
examples of lawyers being “stupid,” that is, failing to take adequate account of
162
the downside risks to themselves and to their clients of rule violations.

Here, we see professional socialization resulting in the evanescence of the
lawyer’s identity as an officer of the court. Similarly finessing the court
officer’s ethical commitments, Cohen states that “agency law forbids agents
from engaging in conduct that is illegal, unethical, immoral, or against public
policy”163—but in four sentences he limits unethical conduct to that which
conflicts with the lawyer’s fiduciary duties to the client, and collapses immoral

158. Id. at 116 (“There is no reason to believe that corruption of judgment is inevitable . . . in
the adversary system. . . . Perhaps the best protection is understanding the illusions themselves,
their pervasiveness, the insidious way they work on us.” (internal citation omitted)).
159. Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 711 (1998) (ellipsis in original).
160. 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
161. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(4) (1983).
162. Gordon, supra note 159, at 711.
163. Cohen, supra note 121, at 402 (emphasis added).
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conduct and that which contravenes public policy into a single category,
sweeping them under the rug of “criminal, or quasi-criminal . . . conduct
involving alcohol, gambling, and prostitution.”164
Even when we focus on the lawyer as the client’s agent, the legal
limitations on that agency role are too numerous and substantial simply to
collapse into the realm of legal limitations on the behavior of all citizens. For
example, the agent with multiple principals is no stranger to agency law: even
when a court explicitly appoints a fiduciary, such as a bankruptcy trustee for a
corporation, or a guardian for a ward of the state, those agents also may be
viewed as agents of the court. Further, a trustee may have equivalent
obligations to various family members; a corporate director may have
hierarchized obligations to shareholders, prioritizing common shareholders
over preferred shareholders. A lawyer’s agency duties to her client neither
foreclose nor subordinate her duties to the court of justice.165
At a minimum, the structure of Cohen’s own description of agency law
indicates that moral limitations on the lawyer’s role complement and are
distinct from the other three sets of limitations mentioned. Public policy
limitations on the lawyer’s role as the client’s agent include those entailed in
the public’s interest in fair play and substantial justice in the workings of its
judiciary—in the rule of law. Cohen limits the duties of an officer of the court
to “process obligations” that he claims are consistent with her client-advocacy
duties,166 while asserting that being an officer of the court involves no
substantive duty to seek justice. Squinting at the lawyer through this narrow
view of agency law, Cohen misses the connection between a lawyer’s
procedural obligations and the public’s constitutionally guaranteed interests in
fairness and justice.167
Gordon describes the lawyer as an agent of the client, but unlike Cohen,
recognizes that lawyers must be “agents of the common framework of
institutions, customs, and norms within which their client’s interests must be

164. Id. at 402–03 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted):
Unethical conduct seems limited to misrepresentations, self-dealing or other behavior
conflicting with the agent’s fiduciary duties. Immoral conduct and conduct that is against
public policy seem limited to behavior sanctioned by criminal, or quasi criminal, statutes
or regulations. These terms apply to conduct involving alcohol, gambling, and
prostitution. None of this conduct is the object of serious interest to those advocating that
the lawyer’s role should include a substantive duty to seek justice.
165. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1199 (2006)
(“Foremost, zeal coexists with many other duties, not just the duty to obey the law, and zeal does
not override these obligations.”).
166. Cohen, supra note 121, at 350. Later, Cohen admits that the lawyer’s role as the court’s
officer entails substantive duties as well, and then immediately reduces those to the function of
screening meritless claims. Id. at 358–59 & n.30.
167. U.S. CONST. Amend. V & XIV.
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pursued if the premises underlying all these individual exercises of freedom are
to be made good.”168 Gordon points out that lawyers are and must be “curators
of the public framework[]”169 since they are “in a unique position both to
ensure that [framework] arrangements are carried into effect and to sabotage
them,”170—a position of public trust. In parallel, Deborah Hensler and Judith
Resnik argue that “because lawyers are specially situated actors within the
justice system, their norms of professionalism must internalize law’s
commitment to equal treatment”171; therefore, they would “includ[e], as a
professional obligation” in addition to those of an officer of the court,
“advocacy for and insistence on the practice of equality.”172 Bill Ong Hing
argues for the lawyer’s duty to “work[] for the common good,”173 finding this
duty to be consistent with her “‘obligation to the legal system in [her] capacity
as an officer of the court’” as articulated by the American Bar Association
Commission on Professionalism.174 Yet, for Hensler and Resnik the term
“officer[] of the court” “no longer suffices.”175 For Gordon, the terms
“ethics”176 and “officer of the court”177 have lost their abilities to refer to the
lawyer’s responsibilities to “carry out the public framework-regarding aims of
the legal system[,]”178 so he refers to these as the lawyer’s “public
responsibilities[.]”179
However, as discussed above, as an officer of the court the lawyer is an
integral part of our judicial framework that critically connects with someone
who would be heard by the court and translates that person’s call into matter
appropriate for legal action. Thus, though strained in a discursive tug-of-war,
the term “officer of the court” nonetheless refers to the public responsibilities
that Gordon describes as well as to the function of the lawyer-as-advocate that
Hazard describes. Moreover, the lawyer’s function as a client-connector and

168. Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE:
LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 140, at 42, 44–45.
169. Id. at 47.
170. Id. at 45.
171. Deborah R. Hensler & Judith Resnik, Contested Identities, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE:
LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 140, at 240, 242.
172. Id. at 255.
173. Hing, supra note 107, at 904.
174. Id. at 924 n.126 (quoting ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “IN THE SPIRIT OF
PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM, 112
F.R.D. 243, 279–80 (1986)).
175. Hensler & Resnik, supra note 171, at 255.
176. Gordon, supra note 168, at 43 (“‘Ethics’ has come to mean either . . . the detailed
technical rules in the professional-ethics codes; or, . . . a strictly personal morality” that “people
just have or don’t have[.]”).
177. Id. at 45 (implying that the term “officer of the court” is now merely “ritualistic”).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 43.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

472

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI:425

translator for the court, when regarded in light of the unequal distribution of
legal services, further implies that the bar already has an obligation to be
socially diverse. If a diverse bar could better effect the administration of
justice, then the concept of the officer of the court already embraces the
unrealized professional obligations identified by Hensler and Resnik. But from
Cohen’s straitened perspective, it is difficult to see the lawyer as an officer of
the court. Amalia Kessler argues that the discourse of adversarial ideology
obscures our heritage from equity procedure.180 This discourse also obscures
the established dimensions of the lawyer’s function as a court officer, and
hinders the lawyer from more fully realizing her professional identity.
The view of the lawyer as an agent for representation in court rests
comfortably within the realm of the lawyer’s duties to the court, neither
exceeding nor superseding them. Missing the connection between a lawyer’s
duties to the court and to the client leads to the unnecessary conclusion that the
“[i]mposition of duties that clash with the duty of loyalty to client—in effect
agency duties to the court or justice—would dramatically redefine the agency
concept and lawyer role.”181 Instead, the lawyer’s role as an officer of the
court comprises and indeed provides for her role as the party’s advocate.
Interestingly, Cohen’s article is constructed more like a piece of advocacy
than scholarship: statements dismissing the lawyer’s duty to the court of justice
are sarcastically worded; contradicting or limiting evidence and opinion are
downplayed, parenthesized, and pushed into footnotes; and weighty
conclusions depend from a worn narrative thread. Perhaps this choice of
genre, which brackets opposing argument, reveals a great sympathy for the
advocating lawyer and a wish to relieve her of the strain of the professional
double-bind. However, while energetic denial of the lawyer’s identity as an
officer of the court reduces cognitive dissonance from the underperformance of
the lawyer’s procedural role, it also damages both lawyers’ own and the
public’s understandings of the legal profession. Effectively rationalizing the
lawyer-as-mouthpiece condemned by Chief Justice Burger,182 this denial
forgets that the role of an officer of the court is essential—not optional—to the
lawyer. A lawyer who does not act as an officer of the court does not act as a
lawyer, but merely passes herself off as one, rendering representation before

180. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1184 (2005):
Our ability to deploy inquisitorial procedure as a remedy for the excesses of the
adversarial has been stymied, however, by an unnecessary, adversarial ideology, based on
a false reading of our own history. As a result, instead of self-consciously and
systematically reflecting on the structure and nature of inquisitorial procedure, we have
engaged in ad hoc and often confused tinkering.
181. Cohen, supra note 121, at 404.
182. See supra Part I.B.
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the court a charade. In arguing from his conclusion, Cohen substitutes
ideology for ethics.
Cohen also expresses concern that recognition of the officer’s duties in the
administration of justice will allow “moral activists . . . to substitute their
views of morality in place of the law.”183 But moral substitution does not
follow from the observation that these duties exist. This concern parallels
concerns over judicial activism, that unless judges behave as ideal legal
formalists—mechanical shuttles weaving legal discourse according to a fully
predetermined program—judges will effect tyranny. But we have no robotjudges: our best hope for just adjudication relies on human judges to exercise
their judgment, to weigh the equities of the cases before them. We rely on
their professionalism,184 which seems more likely to be fair and just than a
machine would be—especially since a machine would have to be programmed
by someone with not only legislation and common law, but with institutional
historical knowledge, and with relative weights for applying balancing tests to
specific constellations of facts—that is, with values to use in the calculations of
holding. The moral function of a judge seems inevitable, however legitimately
we may fear its abuses. The layered structure of our judiciary is designed to
some extent to rein the operation of a loose-thread individual’s values in place
of the public values reflected in the legal designs of our social fabric: appellate
review, some ability for a party to choose a different judge, impeachment
procedures, and codes of professional conduct for judges—the public’s legal,
ethical, and normative professional expectations for judges—converge to shape
our efforts to establish and administer justice pursuant to our Constitution.
Similarly, robot lawyers do not assist our judges. Instead, we rely on the
lawyer’s professional judgment to protect the integrity of the adversarial
system of justice. Like judges, lawyers are bound by prescriptive and
proscriptive rules, ethics and norms to perform not as agents of their own (nor
of any individual’s) personal value systems, but as officers of the court. That
is, the public relies upon lawyers to perform their professional duties according
to the system of laws and values that provides for and directs the court to
establish justice.185 The lawyer is present because she swore to “serve, protect,

183. Cohen, supra note 121, at 409. Cohen further suggests that lawyers subject to scruples
of conscience can’t stand the heat and should get out of the kitchen. Id.:
For those moral activists who are uncomfortable with the tension that exists when there is
a difference between what the law allows and their morality and values the answer is
urging law reform or another occupation. The answer is not for moral activists to deny
clients access to the law, or worse, to substitute their views of morality in place of the law.
184. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Fair & Independent Courts, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at
8; Stephen Breyer, Serving America’s Best Interests, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 139.
185. U.S. CONST. Preamble (we establish our Constitution in part to “establish Justice”); see
also Oxford English Dictionary Online, justice, n., II.5.a (2d ed. 1989) (“The administration of
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foster and promote the fair and impartial administration of justice,”186 and is
bound by her oath to uphold the Constitution. The lawyer’s ability to keep her
oath, to be as good as her word, is central to her professional identity and
integrity. The view that lawyers have “no substantive duty to seek justice”187
urges that Constitutional, historical, and structural manifestations of our courts
do not matter.
As the myopic view of the lawyer as a mere client-advocate ostensibly
frees her from the double-bind, it unmoors her from the very legal institutions
that formed her to assist in their function. Relying on the professionalism of
individual judges and lawyers in our adversary system of justice may give us
pause, but relaxing their professional constraints should send us reeling.
Cohen expresses concern that if the lawyer were meaningfully an officer of the
court, she might “substitute [her] own views of morality in place of the
law”188—but the court’s officer is to use her professional judgment to represent
the client—to embody the values of the court of justice in our legal system
according to her oath, rather than to abuse her office to promote her own or her
client’s private agenda. If the lawyer forgets her functions as an officer of the
court—if we render the lawyer as an empty vessel for the client—then our real
concern becomes the unchecked flow of the client’s own purposes into the
court, without the professional representation that the court appointed the
lawyer to perform. Cohen’s argument would deprive the lawyer of
professional agency, relieving her of the responsibility to exercise professional
judgment as an officer of the court.
Norman Spaulding describes a situation that similarly troubles the lawyer’s
representation to the court, in which there is “[i]ntense identification between
lawyer and client” or “thick professional identity.”189 Spaulding suggests that
“much in the way of contemporary professional misconduct and malaise[,]”
such as “role confusion [and] lawlessness [inter alia]” is attributable to a
normative shift towards a thickening professional identity for the lawyer.190 In
terms of my analysis, this normative shift places the lawyer more completely in
the realm of the client’s interests, straining her identity as the court’s officer.
However, the lawyer is not merely a passive screen between private interests
and the court, but is instead an active functionary of the court who shapes a
client’s situation into a legally meaningful form appropriate for the court’s

law, or the forms and processes attending it; judicial proceedings; in early use, Legal proceedings
of any kind[.]”).
186. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
187. Cohen, supra note 121, at 405 & passim (e.g., 349–52, 355–88, 409).
188. Id. at 409.
189. Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7
(2003).
190. Id.
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recognition and action. This means that the lawyer has a thick professional
identity with respect to the court, and accordingly should have a thin
professional identity with respect to the client. This thin identity with the
client also protects the lawyer’s personal identity, allowing the lawyer to
represent the client competently even when she does not personally value his
cause, and protects the lawyer’s integrity as an officer of the court.191 When
the lawyer acts as Cohen’s unmoored client-agent, or as Spaulding’s toothickly-client-identified lawyer, the client manifests before the court
improperly, and the integrity of the court’s weave is compromised—the social
fabric weakens.
Further, the standard conception is symptomatic of “our current procedural
ailments” that Kessler traces to our “Failure to recall . . . the quasi-inquisitorial
nature of our equity tradition”: this tradition valued due process as a check on
arbitrary state action, and for its truth-seeking function that promoted justice
by ensuring that meritorious claims would prevail.192 The adversary system of
justice depends on a neutral decisionmaker to decide who has what right, based
on presentations of honest (and not misleading) legal arguments193 supported
by accurate (and not false or misleading) facts194. The rule of law is promoted
over arbitrary decisionmaking by the court’s empirical reach through its
lawyers into the realm of the client. The lawyer is present to effect this
reach—not to misdirect it.
Spaulding’s discussion of the potentially “thin professional identity” of the
lawyer, in which she performs competently for the client regardless of whether
she personally approves of the client’s cause, provides another response to
Cohen’s concern about the lawyer’s improper use of the client’s cause.
Though Spaulding emphasizes the lawyer’s duties to the client in his
discussion, this aspect of the lawyer’s role survives the shift to the framework
of Fig. 3, in which the lawyer is first and always the officer of the court, having
duties both to the court and to the client to manifest the client before it as fully
as possible (i.e., with a thin professional identity) subject to the rules of the

191. See Gordon, supra note 99, at 13 (“[A]lthough lawyers’ services and technical skills are
for sale, their personal and political convictions are not, for they each have a core identity that
must be exempt from commodification. The loyalty purchased by the client is limited, because a
part of the lawyer’s professional persona must be set aside for dedication to public purposes.”);
John T. Noonan, Jr., Propter Honoris Respectum: The Lawyer Who Overidentifies with His
Client, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 827, 841 (2001) (The lawyer “must attend to a plurality of
goods—the good of the client, the good of the courts, the good of the lawyer’s partners, and even
in degree the good of the other parties. . . . To serve professionally the persons embodying these
purposes, a lawyer cannot . . . contract his or her identity to the client’s.”).
192. Kessler, supra note 180, at 1251.
193. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
194. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3)–(4).
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circumscribing realm—the constraints of law, legal ethics, and professional
norms to which the lawyer’s professional performance must conform.
The discourses of adversarial ideology and the standard conception make
us forget why we are here, obscuring the lawyer’s professional identity. But
the lawyer’s professional identity as an officer of the court is essential to the
rule of law: we rely on it to ensure that the power of our courts protects not
only private parties, but also our shared interest in the rule of law.
IV. WHY ALWAYS THE FIGHTING?
I have shown that the standard conception of the lawyer as exclusively or
primarily the client’s agent is historically, legally, structurally, and functionally
false; that it can result from backfiring rhetorical framing; and that it can result
in psychologically untenable professional socialization. Clearly, lawyers have
substantial duties in the administration of justice as officers of the court. Why,
then, do some advocate for client advocacy to the point where the officer of the
court fails to matter? How is the profound oath that forms lawyers to the
profession rendered as lip-service, as if members of the bar had entered the
legal profession with their fingers crossed behind their backs?
This occurs when attempts to remind lawyers of their roles as officers of
the court—to weave the structure of adversarial system closer to the pattern
that it was designed to embody—are framed instead as attempts to dispense
with it and its values of autonomy. However, if autonomy were the primary
value of the adversary system of justice, it would be no system at all, but a
free-for-all realm of might-makes-right. This re-framing might favor those
who perceive a deprivation of power from the just operation of law, even when
the reallocation of power in particular cases would result in a stronger social
fabric for all. As litigation becomes more complex, the court relies all the
more on the fair representations of its officers, and it becomes ever more
important to the public that the lawyer embody an officer of the court as she
represents a party before it.195
It is also clear that the adversary system is not an end in itself; rather, it is a
means for serving justice. It is supposed that through the equally skilled legal
representation of only two opposed sides, the truth of a matter will emerge so

195. Judge Rubin’s argument that as factual complexity increases so does our reliance on the
lawyer’s professionalism is even more timely now than when he made it. Judge Alvin B. Rubin,
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Cases: Voice of Liberty or Verdict by Confusion?, 462 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 87, 101 (1982):
Recognizing this, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
proposing changes to impose higher standards on counsel and to encourage judges to
impose sanctions on counsel who abuse the judicial process. The American Bar
Association is considering changes in its Code of Professional Responsibility to require
greater fidelity to the cause of justice in counsel’s conduct of litigation.
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that the judge may treat it.196 Prioritizing the adversarial aspects of our justice
system subordinates its raisons d’être, brushing aside the purposes that it exists
to serve. Setting the scale of the debate at the level of the individual lawyer
leaves the profession that creates, sustains and commits the lawyer out of the
picture—so that the lawyer appears only to serve client interests.
A.

Reconstruction of the Lawyer’s Professional Identity

The present analysis begins with the hypothesis that a lawyer is
meaningfully an officer of the court, and finds evidence for the lawyer’s
professional identity as such in legal history and common law, and in the
structure and function of the current judicial system. This analysis focuses on
the formation of the lawyer’s professional identity as an instance of the
formation of an identity generally, in terms of its interpellation, socialization,
and potential suspension or destruction, and examines the nature of that
identity in terms of its performance. Professional performance is the play of
professional identity: the lawyer’s professional performance entails the
exercise of independent professional judgment to translate between the public
and private realms, assisting in the formation of binding connections between
the two in accordance with the rule of law. Professional judgment extends
beyond idiosyncratic personal judgment in that it is socialized to the norms of
the legal profession, some of which have been articulated in terms of
professional canons, considerations, rules and opinions. The lawyer’s
professional conscience is at the core of her professional identity as an officer
of the court, which is vital to the administration of justice.
This theory of the lawyer’s professional identity further suggests that the
lawyer’s identity and professional actions can be understood as links in chains
of softly dialectical synthetic acts that form new discursive entities through the
application of a maieutic logic that reifies the private individual in publicly
intelligible and material forms. Though this view may sound abstract,
theorizing the lawyer’s professional identity is a practical endeavor,197 in that it
considers how procedural justice and the rule of law are effected in substantial
part through the lawyer’s professional performance. This approach to

196. Note that even if the lawyers representing the two sides were perfectly professional
officers of the court striving to put before the judge the best arguments based solely on honest
representations, the flattening of a complex situation onto only two opposed sides itself may
impede the court’s development of a more accurate and complete factual picture of the matter.
As does increasing factual complexity, factual distortion that inherently arises from the bilateral
structure of the adversarial system places all the more weight on the lawyers’ professionalism as
the court’s officers.
197. Wendel, supra note 84, at 1198. Lawyers have long sought clear guidance as to “how to
reconcile a lawyer’s obligations to the court with his obligations to his client” so that they would
know how to behave professionally; see Curtis, supra note 87, at 11.
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theorizing the lawyer’s identity and ethics complements others’ analyses in
interesting ways.
B.

Identity Theory and Legal Ethics
1. Purposivism

Simon describes purposivism as an “interrupted tradition” premised on the
idea that “legal rules and institutions should be elaborated and applied to
effectuate their purposes.”198 He notes that the professional ethic that
purposivism implies “strives to directly connect the lawyer’s service to
individual clients to the values that underlie applicable legal norms.”199 The
idea of professionalism to which purposivism contributes “proposed a
conception of work that united self-assertion with social commitment and
service to private interest with respect for public norms.”200 Simon further
describes a purposivist approach to resolving ambiguities about the lawyer’s
role by “asking what lawyer conduct would best vindicate the relevant
substantive norms and would best promote fair adjudication of the dispute” in
a way that contemplates the lawyer’s exercise both of “ordinary morality”201
and of a faculty that resembles the “professional conscience” discussed by Fred
Zacharias and Bruce Green.202 Simon notes that, “To a surprising extent,
recent academic theorizing about professional responsibility fails to engage
this tradition and often ignores it completely,”203 and urges that this
perspective “deserves more consideration than much recent academic
professional responsibility discourse has given it.”204
The present functional analysis of the lawyer’s role harmonizes with
Simon’s call, finding the lawyer engaged in the process of elaborating legal
rules and institutions as simultaneously an officer of the court and a client
representative, embodying and crafting connections between the public
institution of law and the private party. The lawyer’s professional identity
emerges in the exercise of her independent professional judgment as she
contributes to the construction of law at a nexus between these realms, crafting
arguments and counterarguments to help in extending the general law to
specific cases. The lawyer’s professional performance requires her to decide
which of her choices would best meet not only the letter but also the goals of
the law, including her Constitutional commitment to fair play and substantial

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Simon, supra note 108, at 1007.
Id. at 1008.
Id.
Id. at 1009.
Zacharias & Green, supra note 90.
Simon, supra note 108, at 1008.
Id. at 1009.
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justice; this ethic that governs her professional performance may provide a
point of contact between the present theory and the purposivism that Simon
describes.
The lawyer’s professional conscience that Zacharias and Green describe is
neither the lawyer’s personal (and thus potentially arbitrary or idiosyncratic)
conscience, nor that of her client assumed by the lawyer in her professional
role as a client-agent; instead, the lawyer’s professional conscience arises from
her duties to the court and its legal system function of effecting justice.205 It is
tempting to map this conscience onto the officer of the court here described,
but the reconstructed lawyer is not a divided self: the lawyer represents her
client as an officer of the court. Since the lawyer cannot be a client-agent
without first and always being an officer of the court, the professional
conscience of the reconstructed lawyer necessarily, fully governs her
performance of both roles. The lawyer herself embodies a site of translation
between the client and the court; the lawyer’s professionalism in translation
entails ethical advocacy, which includes the duty to make true translations and
is informed by the exercise of a conscience that has been socialized, formed
and disciplined, as that of an officer of the court.
2. Independent Professional Judgment
The present analysis examines the question of the lawyer’s professional
identity—its formation and function in the legal system—and finds a coherent
professional subject to legal ethics. The question of this identity is contested in
that some commentators focus on only one of its aspects, while others indicate
that the lawyer is something more: this is the question whether the lawyer is
simply a client’s “mouthpiece”206 or is instead an integral part of the
administration of justice with professional duties to the court.
Under the present analysis, the “something more” is everything: the
assertion of the lawyer-as-mouthpiece so oversimplifies the lawyer’s role that
it misses her basic functions as a discerning translator contributing to social
order. While in contrast, Wendel points out that there is more to the lawyer
than her agency for the client, his “more” is narrower and potentially points in
a different direction: Wendel argues that in interpreting the law, the lawyer has
a professional obligation to remain beyond the role of client-agent and consider
legal norms (“public norms regulating the understanding of legal texts”) as

205. Zacharias & Green, supra note 90.
206. Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Review: Markovits: A Modern Legal Ethics:
Adversary Ethics in a Democratic Age, 108 MICH. L. REV. 925, 937 (2010) (reviewing
MARKOVITS, supra note 89) (“Let us say it plainly: a lawyer is a mouthpiece in the sense that one
of the lawyer’s most important functions is to speak for the client’s interest in the most persuasive
way possible.” (citation omitted)).
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well as the letter of the law.207 Thus, Wendel allows for the lawyer’s exercise
of professional judgment, and constrains that judgment by legal norms of
textual interpretation. However, the ethics of translation, representation and
interpretation inherent in the lawyer’s identity as an officer of the court apply
not only to construing the law for the client but to all of the lawyer’s
professional acts, and thus are not exhausted by the legal interpretive norms
that Wendel describes. Further, Wendel identifies the basis of these norms as
the standards of “an interpretive community that is constituted by fidelity to
law,”208 though of course a law may be unjust, and we may make many moves
in trying to define and identify a community that is faithful only to just laws,
and perhaps agree only on a set of counterexamples. This problem underscores
the importance of the lawyer’s exercise of judgment that is both professional—
socialized to the legal profession as described here—and independent,
allowing the lawyer to have a critical professional perspective on the law as
well. Judges sit simultaneously in law and equity, and lawyers must be able to
advise them in both registers.
In his analysis of a crisis in legal ethics, Hazard notes that the question of
ethics reaches into the question of the lawyer’s professional identity within the
social system.209 Also pointing from legal ethics to professional identity, Alice
Woolley and W. Bradley Wendel offer a psychological approach to legal ethics
that reframes questions about what a lawyer should do in terms of how or who
(what kind of person) a lawyer should be.210 Emphasizing that a lawyer in a
law firm experiences socialization pressures from other members of the
firm,211 Woolley and Wendel liken to Hercules “the ethical actor inherent”212
in Simon’s theory, concluding that “Simon’s lawyer is, in a word, a
maverick”213—primarily because she is expected to exercise independent
professional judgment.214 Similarly, “Luban’s lawyer must . . . have a degree

207. Wendel, supra note 84, at 1191.
208. Id.
209. Hazard, supra note 68, at 1240 (“My root question is . . . Who is ‘we’ when it is said
‘We lawyers . . .’?”).
210. Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1065 (2010).
211. Id. at 1083 (“This [independence] is a remarkable feat given the findings of social
psychologists, who have shown that individuals acting in groups tend to take cues from those
around them when interpreting ambiguous situations.”).
212. Id. at 1074.
213. Id. at 1083.
214. See, e.g., id. at 1082 (italics omitted):
Simon grants no leeway to the lawyer, refusing to condone reliance on the client or
anyone else (including the judgments about justice embodied in legal norms), instead
making the rendering of such jurisprudential judgments the heart of the lawyer’s ethical
obligation. . . .
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of independence of thought, and a disregard for the fact that her opinions will
be unpopular in the institutional and professional context within which she
works.”215 Stressing the importance of a lawyer’s ability to work within an
institutional structure, Woolley and Wendel then ask whether it is desirable
and realistic for lawyers to be people like Simon’s lawyer and Luban’s lawyer;
determining that these ideal lawyers “cannot function easily within an
institution[,]” they suggest that their analysis is “seriously problematic for both
theories.”216
The officer of the court that I describe is interpellated by the court
primarily to exercise her independent professional judgment217—to determine
on Gordon’s empty stage how she will professionally represent a party before
the court. While her ability maieutically to represent her client’s interests
requires her to bracket her personal interests—to use what Daniel Markovits
describes as her “negative capability”218—she is nonetheless required to
manifest the client’s position subject to the integrity of the legal process.219
The court and thereby the public relies on her independence from (or thin
identity with) the client to realize our best efforts in the administration of
justice. A lawyer whose identity is monopolized by the client’s interests is a
Trojan horse: a tool used to undermine the public justice system for the
relatively exclusive benefit of the private party. Another way of expressing
this is to say that a properly functioning lawyer is only secondarily
interpellated by her client, while primarily interpellated by the court. A law
firm that socializes, or calls forth, a lawyer to identify and act primarily as a
lever for its clients misinterpellates the lawyer, sirening her to forget her
professional identity as a court officer.
In response to Woolley and Wendel, Luban suggests that regarding as
unrealistic or dysfunctional the exercise of independent professional and moral

Most significantly, Simon’s lawyer is not relieved of the obligation of deciding what
justice requires by the fact that the law permits something.
215. Id. at 1089.
216. Woolley & Wendel, supra note 210, at 1097.
217. That the court relies on the lawyer’s independence is clear, particularly since the Court
states as much in its description of the duties of the public defender as a court officer. See supra
Part I.B.
218. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 11 (italics retained):
[L]awyers, like poets, are specialists in what I call (following Keats) negative capability:
that is, in the capacity to speak not in one’s own voice but rather, effacing one’s private
judgments, faithfully and authentically to render the subjectivity of another—in the case
of lawyers by giving voice to clients who would otherwise remain inarticulate.
219. Otherwise, the court officer is subject to private capture: by “identifying with particular
types of clients or causes [she] always represent[s],” she “threatens to confuse negative capability
with positive commitment to their side.” David Luban, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary
Advocacy in a Democratic Age, 120 ETHICS 864, 868 (2010) (reviewing MARKOVITS, supra note
89).
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judgment by a lawyer in a law firm is more appropriately a critique of the law
firm than of a theory of legal ethics.220 I would add that not only should a law
firm value its lawyers’ independent judgment, but that a firm’s failure to do so
obstructs the function of the legal system. Interestingly, Woolley and Wendel
note that “[l]aw firms, corporations, and government are institutions within
which lawyers work, but the legal system itself is an institution within which
lawyers are intended to function, and the operation of which lawyers are
intended to foster and protect.”221 In that case, framing the lawyer fully within
her role as an officer of the court affords her some psychological comfort after
all: fulfilling her (primary) duties to the public requires her to act and to be like
a Simonian and Lubanian lawyer—and thus to function well within our legal
system.
Both Hazard and Russell Pearce note the impact of the client as a business
entity on the lawyer’s professional identity.
Hazard has analyzed
Tocqueville’s reading of American lawyers as aristocrats, and described
lawyers as elites whose “role was actualized in our society by linking the legal
profession to the courts, on one end, and to business enterprise on the other
end.”222 Hazard theorized a crisis in lawyers’ ethics and identity as an attack
from the left on their ties to business, and from the right on lawyers’ elitism.
Pearce also sees the lawyer as an elite, who performs a “governing class” role
that has been thinning along the lines of a “Business-Profession” dichotomy as
lawyers regard themselves either as hired guns or as public servants.223 Pearce
notes, however, that the dichotomy could be abandoned by lawyers’
identifying thickly with the governing class role.
The governing class role may be analogized in some respects to the
officer-of-the-court role; to the extent that the analogy holds, the lawyer’s thick
identity with that originary role is appropriate. Like Spaulding, I see the
necessity to the lawyer’s function of her thin identification with her client224—
but unlike Spaulding, I see the necessity arising neither directly nor primarily
(but instead, indirectly and secondarily) from the norm of client service. I
perceive that her identity and function as an officer of the court is the lawyer’s
sine qua non, and maintain that the lawyer requires a thicker professional
identity with the court than with the client to function effectively in the
administration of justice.

220. David Luban, How Must a Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley and Wendel, 23 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1101, 1112–13 (2010).
221. Woolley & Wendel, supra note 210, at 1097.
222. Hazard, supra note 68, at 1278.
223. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers As America’s Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 381 (2001).
224. Spaulding, supra note 189, at 7.
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3. Functional Analysis and Reconstruction of the Lawyer’s Professional
Identity
The understanding of the lawyer that results from the present analysis
regards her function as a client counselor and representative as integral but
logically subordinate to her originary and overarching function as an officer of
the court. Debates about whether the lawyer is primarily a client advocate or
court officer thus are not chicken-or-egg debates that are doomed to spin
eternally: the strained argument that the lawyer is nothing but an agent of the
client results from an artificially narrow view of the lawyer. Related
arguments that the term “officer of the court” is empty are themselves hollow,
as seen in an example provided by Robert Martineau. Martineau argues that
the title “officer of the court” is used by courts as a mere excuse for the courts’
dependence upon and regulation of the lawyer, and that such use is
“dangerous” because “the label will soon become a substitute for the necessary
functional analysis.”225 This paper presents the necessary functional analysis,
which shows that the title has a substantive meaning that is fundamental to the
lawyer’s professional identity and is essential to the lawyer’s function in the
administration of justice.
The closest methodological approach to that of this paper is the
reconstructive analysis of the lawyer’s role provided by Daniel Markovits in A
Modern Legal Ethics, which parallels the present analysis in intriguing ways.
First, Markovits attributes to lawyers in their professional functions the vices
of ordinary lying and cheating, finding these vices to result not from excessive
zeal, but instead to be “deeply ingrained in the genetic structure of adversary
advocacy.”226 So, rather than pose hypothetical dilemmas in legal ethics and
consider how the law of lawyering might be developed better to manage them,
Markovits engages in an interpretive reconstruction of the adversary system
and the lawyer’s function within it. His analysis essentially regards these
lawyerly vices as symptoms of the lawyer’s proper professional functions,
which he describes in terms of the proposed lawyerly virtues of negative
capability and fidelity. He suggests that the lawyer’s self-understanding in
terms of these virtues opens the possibility of her maintaining personal
integrity while functioning as a legal professional, and of a felicitous
conclusion to the story of legal ethics—though in the end, he diagnoses the
lawyer’s professional situation as one of tragic villainy, for modern society
does not afford to lawyers the cultural resources needed to sustain their
integrity.

225. Robert J. Martineau, The Attorney As an Officer of the Court: Time to Take the Gown off
the Bar, 35 S.C. L. REV. 541, 572 (1983).
226. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 2.
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My approach similarly has not been to pose hypotheticals to the law of
lawyering, but instead to engage in an interpretive reconstruction of the
lawyer’s professional identity. It is helpful to compare our analyses more
closely, for despite interesting resonances between them, their conclusions
diverge.
i.

Divergent Reconstructions

Both the present analysis and Markovits’ explore how the judge and the
lawyer relate, noting the structural separation and functional division of labor
between the lawyer and the judge. Whereas Markovits emphasizes a moral
division of labor and its importance to the political legitimacy of the legal
process, I focus on its epistemological aspects. As Markovits states, “the
forms of adjudication that [his argument] describes will fall short of producing
justice[.]”227 Nonetheless, to the extent that the administration of justice is a
real or even ostensible purpose of the legal process, the truth-values of the
factual and argumentative statements on which adjudication is based matter.
But Markovits passes over the epistemological aspects of this division of labor.
For example, in noting that his ethical analysis applies to inquisitorial systems
as well, he mentions that the German system of adjudication shares with that of
the U.S. a structural separation between advocate and tribunal: “outside the
realm of fact-gathering, German civil procedure is about as adversarial as our
own.”228 However, this distinguishing characteristic between the role-based
duties of U.S. and German lawyers has important consequences for the
lawyer’s integrity: that the latter are responsible for arguing in an adversarial
way, but not for gathering facts adversarially, shifts fundamental
epistemological work across the divide from the lawyer to the judge. This shift
simplifies the lawyer’s functions, rendering the structure of the German legal
system better able to promote the lawyer’s professional integrity in that
lawyers have little opportunity and less incentive to mis-represent facts.
Judicial integrity then becomes more directly subject to the burden of
developing complete and accurate facts, and the judge’s lack of bias in favor of
a party becomes even more crucial to the rule of law.
Considering the epistemological aspects of the division of labor between
the judge and the lawyer foregrounds the significance of lying and cheating as
particularly vicious acts for a lawyer. The soundness of a judicial opinion
depends on the quality of the facts on which the opinion is based; thus, its
justification is vitiated when a lawyer places before the fact-finder evidence
that is inaccurate or is crafted to lead the fact-finder’s judgment astray. Yet
according to Markovits, “Unlike juries and judges, adversary lawyers should
227. Id. at 177.
228. Id. at 15 (emphasis added) (quoting John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L REV. 823, 841 (1985)).
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not pursue a true account of the facts of a case . . . . Instead, they should try
aggressively to manipulate both the facts and the law to suit their clients’
purposes. . . . In short, lawyers must lie.”229
This interpretation of the lawyer’s function ignores how deeply her work
affects the epistemic basis of adjudication, which contributes both to its
legitimacy and to its possibility of justice. Discerning the lawyer’s function as
an officer of the court compels the realization that a lawyer is duty-bound to
strive to develop a true account of the facts of a case, and a fortiori that the
lawyer must not manipulate facts to lower their truth-value—for in doing so,
the lawyer manipulates the fact-finder away from the possibility of producing a
legitimate and just opinion. All actors in the legal system have a duty not to
undermine the epistemological basis of justice (the administration of which is
the court’s raison d’être): lawyers, parties, judges, court reporters—must not
lie.
The legal system230 relies on judges to make well informed, reasonable and
impartial decisions, rather than arbitrary rulings. The judge relies on the
lawyer to call his attention to facts concerning her client that are neither false
nor misleading, and then to make the best argument for her party that she can
on the basis of those facts. Yet under Markovits’ description, lawyers “should
strive disproportionately and at times almost exclusively to promote their
clients’ interests. This requires lawyers to . . . employ delaying tactics, file
strategically motivated claims, or exploit a law’s form to thwart its substantive
purposes. In short, lawyers must cheat.”231 The “almost” suggests that
Markovits senses the boundaries of the lawyer’s professional duty, marked in
part by her Rule 11 certifications that she is not making a representation to the
court “for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation,” and that her legal arguments are
“warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”232 Of
course, Markovits is aware of Rule 11, and reasonably reads it to leave open
the possibility for a lawyer to make a legal argument that she “believe[s] will
(and should) lose.”233 But to function in the administration of justice, the court
must be able to rely on the lawyer’s representations that “to the best of [her]
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under

229. Id. at 3.
230. I use the term “court” both in the literal sense discussed supra Part I.C.—the lawyer is an
officer appointed by the court to practice before it—and by synecdoche to refer to the legal
system: a court is an organ of the legal system. A lawyer is an officer of the court, and is thus a
functionary of the legal system.
231. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 3–4 (italics added).
232. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
233. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 60.
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the circumstances,”234 her arguments are supported by evidence (not lies) and
presented for proper purposes (not to cheat). The lawyer’s good-faith belief
that her representations comply with Rule 11 indicates not only a duty not to
throw the game (or engage in manifest injustice), but also an epistemological
duty not to bias or unfairly persuade the judge: a lawyer must not cheat.
Markovits sees virtues in the lawyer that could accommodate the purported
institutional needs to lie and cheat within an integrated professional identity:
negative capability, and fidelity. Comparing the lawyer’s maieutic functions
that I describe with Markovits’ lawyerly virtues shows how both of our
analyses can go farther than Markovits pressed.
I earlier described the maieutic ethic as a professional ethic that “requires
the professional to serve as a faithful translator, speaking for those whose
voices have been unintelligible and thus have not mattered”235 in a professional
system.
Markovits analogously adapts the term “negative capability” from Keats’
description of a poet’s function:236 negative capability is a capacity “for
assisting persons who cannot themselves speak in a way that engages the
authoritative institutions of government to state their claims in an undistorted
and yet effective fashion.”237 Negative capability entails self-effacement: as
the poet “maintain[s] ‘no identity’ of [her] own, and (through this selfeffacement) . . . work[s] continually as a medium, ‘filling some other body—
The Sun, the Moon, the Sea . . .’ and rendering this ordinarily mute body
articulate,” so does the lawyer “enable[] her otherwise inarticulate clients to
speak through her.”238
I have described maieusis as boundary work that requires one to bracket
one’s personal interests, and so to exercise one’s independent professional
judgment in: preventing improper material from crossing the boundary, acting
on information from one side of the boundary so that it may pass to the other
side in a proper form, and “allow[ing] information to cross the boundary with
high fidelity.”239
Similarly, to accompany negative capability, Markovits sees another
distinctively lawyerly virtue associated with this capacity to give voice to the
voiceless in high fidelity. Lawyerly fidelity involves more than merely
partisan partiality in favor of clients over others; it also includes the capacity
accurately to identify and to articulate clients’ points of view, including even

234. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
235. Hussey Freeland, supra note 59, at 471.
236. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 11.
237. Id. at 5.
238. Id. at 93 (footnote omitted) (quoting JOHN KEATS, Letter to Richard Woodhouse, 27 Oct.
1818, in LETTERS OF JOHN KEATS 157, 157 (Robert Gittings ed., 1970)).
239. Hussey Freeland, supra note 59, at 381 (emphasis added); see also supra Part II.A.
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in clients who are themselves inarticulate (and to do so without distortion from
240
the lawyers’ own views of what their clients deserve or ought to prefer).

Markovits’ negative capability corresponds to the bracketing (or
effacement) that allows one to act as a medium or channel for something other
than oneself, and Markovits’ fidelity corresponds to the professional duty to
represent the other without distortion. However, he does not extend the virtues
of his analysis to the lawyer’s identity or functions with respect to the court.
When we think of a lawyer as a client-advocate it follows that the lawyer must
not replace the client’s interests with her own—but this is only part of the
story. The lawyer is not a mere mouthpiece for the client; instead, the lawyer
performs the representation in a dual role: that of an officer of the court who
translates the client into a party to a legal action. As a maieutic actor on behalf
of the legal system, the lawyer’s boundary work further entails screening
improper material (whether false, misleading or simply irrelevant) from the
court, and translating the client’s material interests into matter appropriate for
legal action. On the empty stage of the lawyer’s negative capability, she crafts
the engagement of the public legal system with the private client, and only out
of fidelity to the former is she available to the latter.
Even within the narrower view of the lawyer, the assertion that the lawyer
lies on behalf of her client is an assertion that she fails in her Markovitsian
fidelity, for if she were to make a false statement, she would distort and misrepresent the client. If in her professional judgment she determines to be false
a proposition that her client would make to the court, then she must not make
it. Further, the assertion that the lawyer lies is an assertion that she fails in her
negative capability—for by definition, to lie she must assert something that she
believes to be false. Professionally, she is bound to assert the screening beliefs
reflected in Rule 11: that in good faith and after diligence she believes her
propositions to be supported by evidence, warranted by law, and neither false
nor misleading. It would be unprofessional to press further personally to
endorse as true or to repudiate as false a proposition that she believes to be notfalse-and-perhaps-true, for such endorsement or repudiation would overstep

240. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 5 (italics retained). Although he describes negative
capability as a distinctively lawyerly virtue, Markovits adapts it from a description of a poet’s
ability. I have described maieusis more generally:
As when a professional actor speaks for a represented character, maieutic ethics
govern professional performance in theatre and other fields. For example, a judge must
allow the law to work through him while withholding personal bias to the extent possible,
and an attorney in litigation must speak for his client and also as an officer the court.
Maieusis may occur even when the ideas that are to be communicated are one’s own, as
when a professional fiction writer strives to place his pen in the service of a character, or a
nonfiction writer to diarize faithfully.
Hussey Freeland, supra note 59, at 383 n.14.
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her role in the epistemological division of labor, usurping the fact-finder’s
office in assigning to the proposition a truth-value.
The vices that Markovits contextualizes in virtue map into my analysis
either beyond the reach of the officer of the court, or as symptoms of her
maieutic performance. I have used the work of the actor to describe maieutic
performance more generally:
[R]epresentation of [the actor] in a professional role signals to the audience
that she is not about to speak as a private person, but as a representative of
something else. Were a professional actor named “Ian Holm” to portray
Hamlet, he would be understood not to be lying to his audience by saying,
“This is I, Hamlet the Dane,” but to be representing the truth of the character
241
portrayed.

The context of the actor’s performance alerts her audience that they are to
recognize that she is playing a role, and that her role morality as an actor not
only allows but requires her to make statements that re-present the character.
Similarly, the context of the lawyer’s performance (especially identifying
herself as the client’s counsel) signals to those who see her performance that
they are not to assume that she believes that what she is saying is true, nor that
she personally favors the arguments she puts forward on behalf of her client.
Instead, her audience is to recognize that she is playing a role, performing
professionally the representation of her client as a party to a legal action, and
that her role morality not only allows but requires her to put forward facts that
favor the client (but not frauds, misrepresentations, etc.) and to argue from
them as best she can—all within the duties binding her originary role as an
officer of the court. The lawyer performs dual roles simultaneously, and the
audience—especially the judge or jury—should and must be able to rely on her
performing both roles harmoniously—else we cannot rely on the integrity of
the legal system, which depends on the proper function of each court.
Markovits addresses arguments that liken lawyers to actors in an effort to
controvert his diagnosis that lawyers lie and cheat. He characterizes these
arguments as having two elements: that lawyers’ statements do not assert what
they say, and that lawyers personally are dissociated from their statements.
To the first element, he replies that “whereas actors’ statements promote
only the suspension of disbelief, lawyers’ statements promote false belief,”242
and that promoting false belief is closer to the ordinary vice of lying.
However, the epistemological expectations of the audience for the actor and
the lawyer diverge. The lawyer’s audience is more actively engaged in the
epistemological work of the performance—not lowering its epistemological
standards to let fictional ideas play on its mind as the actor’s audience does,
241. Hussey Freeland, supra note 59, at 383 (footnotes omitted) (quoting WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 5, sc. 1).
242. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 38.
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but instead scrutinizing the performance to determine what should materialize
as the knowledge upon which a judicial decision will be based. Fact-finders
are on notice to resist being gulled by the lawyer’s attempts to persuade them,
whether the lawyer is acting in good or bad faith (for this will likely be
unknown to the fact-finder), and thus the lawyer’s audience resists the
miscarriage of justice that occurs when a party deceives or cheats the public.
While the suspension of disbelief is the “voluntary withholding of
scepticism”243 on the part of the actor’s audience, the lawyer’s audience—in
particular, the judge and jury—can serve as responsible fact-finders only by
engaging their heightened skepticism while listening to the opposed
arguments.
This is to say that their complementary audiences meet actors and lawyers
at different rhetorical points: Sir Ian’s audience knows (or is reasonably
expected to know) that he is not Hamlet the Dane, and yet Sir Ian need suffer
no conscience for having lied to the audience; meanwhile, the judge and jury
know (and are not only reasonably expected but professionally relied upon to
know) that the lawyer is performing the speech of the party without necessarily
claiming that his propositions are true. The more skillfully the fact-finder
fulfills the epistemological rigors of his juridical role, the more comfortably
the lawyer can expect that she will be understood to be conveying the party’s
account (which to the best of her knowledge and belief, may or may not be
true) rather than to be promoting in them a false belief. Indeed, actually or
constructively knowingly promoting false belief in the fact-finder is
antithetical to the lawyer’s function as an officer of the court: “the actor’s
misrepresentation . . . is an act that does not conform to the maieutic ethic.”244
Ironically, Markovits asserts that promoting false belief “is an essential
part of the adversary legal process, whose claims to function as a truthgenerating mechanism require that courts treat lawyers’ statements as serious
propositions, in the sense of being open to believing what they assert.”245 But
the audience’s openness to belief must be accompanied by its heightened—not
relaxed—skepticism if the legal process can have any fair or legitimate claim
to function as a truth-generating mechanism. While the fact-finder must be
open-minded, he must not be credulous, for forming facts under too low an
epistemological standard contributes to the arbitrariness of the resulting
decisionmaking and undermines the epistemological bases of the rule of law.246

243.
244.
245.
246.

Oxford English Dictionary Online, suspension n., I.3.b (2d ed. 1989).
Hussey Freeland, supra note 59, at 390.
MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 38.
See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, HANDBOOK FOR TRIAL JURORS
SERVING IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 7 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Jury/trialhandbook.pdf (“[T]he jury should maintain its objectivity
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In other words, the fact-finder has a duty to apply its faculties of honesty,
intelligence, integrity and good judgment to weighing the evidence itself,247
putting that evidence to the test by applying the requisite standard of proof
while disregarding statements by the lawyer that are not supported by such
proof.248
The second element of the lawyer-as-actor analogy that Markovits sees is
finely similar to the first: the former focuses on what a lawyer’s statement
asserts, and the latter emphasizes what the lawyer asserts through her
statement. Markovits claims that “lawyers have far less role-distance [from
their statements] than [do] actors,” because unlike actors, lawyers cannot
“comfortably step out of their roles to speak in their own voices and denounce
the characters that they play.”249 Of course, it would be unprofessional for an
actor to do this as well—unless doing so were part of the play, part of the
professional performance itself—but Markovits urges that the lawyer is to
pretend (ironically) to be sincere in representing the client, so to lend
credibility to her client’s cause. While acknowledging that the lawyer is
prohibited from personally vouching for her client as demonstrated in MRPC
3.4(e), he argues that “it is quite possible to lie even without vouching, simply
by employing other means in the service of an intent to deceive.”250 However,
the Rule does not tolerate even an allusion—neither a covert nor hinted
suggestion—from the lawyer of “any matter that . . . will not be supported by
admissible evidence.”251
So, if the lawyer does not believe that an argument that she advances on
behalf of her client has evidentiary support, either because the evidence is
misleading or is false (in which case it is not admissible, and cannot properly

and base its verdict strictly upon the testimony and exhibits received in evidence at trial.”); id. at
12–13.
247. Id. at 13 (“There is no more valuable work that the average citizen can perform in
support of our Government than the full and honest discharge of jury duty. The effectiveness of
the democratic system itself is largely measured by the integrity, the intelligence, and the general
quality of citizenship of the jurors who serve in our courts.”); see also id. at 12 regarding the
impropriety of arbitrary fact-finding (“It would be dishonest for a judge to decide a case by
tossing a coin. It would be just as dishonest for a juror to do so.”).
248. Id. at 10 (“The opening and closing statements of the lawyers are not evidence. A juror
should disregard any statements made by a lawyer in argument that have not been proved by the
evidence.”).
249. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 38 (italics retained).
250. Id. at 39.
251. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2010):
A lawyer shall not: . . . (e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert
personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability
of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused[.]
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serve as the basis of any argument), then she violates the Rule simply by
stating it—let alone by pretending to believe it as she states it. The lawyer’s
epistemological relation to her statement before the court must be that she
believes that the statement might be true; she poses a proposition, the truth of
which is to be determined by the fact-finder in accordance with the adversary
system’s epistemological division of labor. This is not to say that the
statement is actually neither true nor false until the fact-finder declares it to be
one or the other; instead, it means that the lawyer has investigated the
statement and believes that it is not false and might be true, and that the factfinder will consider it in light of other statements before him in determining the
statement’s epistemological status within the legal system.
Markovits fairly characterizes as a lie a lawyer’s apparent sincerity even as
she disbelieves what she states to the fact-finder, and he describes this feigned
sincerity as a practical necessity, “a literal demand on the lawyer,”252 a
“strategem . . . that is probably an inevitable feature of every adversary legal
practice,”253 for if the audience knows that the lawyer does not believe her
statement, then the lawyer has failed to be persuasive.254 But a lawyer’s
perceived practical need to win a case for her client is not an official and a
fortiori not her sole nor overriding duty: the lawyer’s duty to represent a party
before the court is not an unbounded duty to succeed in convincing the factfinder to favor her client—not a duty to mislead the fact-finder, to misrepresent the party in order to win.255 To conceive of the lawyer’s professional
duty only as a duty to win for the client is to mistake her professional identity,
to forget that the lawyer who represents a client is simultaneously performing
two roles: professionally, she performs as an officer of the court as she
represents the party.
We can assess how Markovits’ characterization of the lawyer-as-actor
argument fares in light of the epistemological division of labor between
advocate and tribunal, and of the lawyer’s situation as an actor who performs
in nested maieutic roles. The first element is that like actors’ statements,
“lawyers’ statements do not assert anything, and certainly do not assert what
they literally say[.]”256 As an officer of the court, the lawyer representing a
party before the court makes a statement to the court on behalf of the party.
This statement cannot be a judgment about the client, for if it were, then the
adversarial division of labor would be violated. Instead, the lawyer’s statement
is a proposition put forth for consideration by the court: it proposes a way of

252.
253.
254.
255.
(2003).
256.

MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 38.
Id. at 263 n.56.
Id.
Ellen Pansky, Remedy: Communication and Diligence, 52 EMORY L.J. 1277, 1283
MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 38.
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viewing the matter in issue, which the court will consider seriously as it
performs its part in the division of epistemological labor. The court’s part is to
“find” the facts considering all the evidence before it: to assign truth-values to
the lawyers’ propositions. The lawyer does not determine the truth-value of
her own statement—does not assert that her statement is true. Before making
her statement to the court, however, she will have screened its content to assure
that the statement is not false or misleading. In this way, she acts as a filter on
behalf of the court, preventing inappropriate matter from distracting the factfinder, while also acting as a portal for the client that translates his experience
into matter appropriate for legal action. Thus the fact of her statement certifies
only that there is (or is reasonably expected to be) evidentiary support for its
content, and not that she believes the content to be true. Hence, the statement
proposes, but does not assert, its content.
The second element is that like actors, lawyers personally are dissociated
from their statements. To remain an officer of the court, the lawyer must
maintain a professional detachment from the client—otherwise the lawyer
becomes the client, and does not professionally represent him as a party. This
dissociation relies not only on the lawyer’s epistemological agnosticism
regarding the truth-value of her statements to the court, but also on the court’s
recognition that she is lending her voice to another. The audience’s
professionalism257 entails an a priori understanding and expectation that the
lawyer will represent someone else, and the formalism of the court proceedings
further signals to the audience the need for its professionalism.
ii. Harmonies and Dissonances
Contrasting with its theme that a lawyer’s ordinary lying and cheating arise
inevitably from the structure of the adversary system, Markovits’ treatment of
professional detachment harmonizes for a moment with mine in explaining
both the lawyer’s partisanship and the limits of that partisanship: “Most
generally, fidelity and negative capability condemn forms of lying that help
clients to misrepresent rather than to express themselves and forms of cheating
that close off rather than open up the judicial process.”258 This statement
wholly applies to the maieutic ethic.
Markovits offers his lawyerly virtues as a hope that might sustain the
lawyer’s personal integrity, for “professional ethics requires lawyers to betray
their own senses of truth and justice in ways that contravene the ethic of self-

257. Professionalism poses a distinction between one’s acting as an institutional entity (e.g.,
in the role of a judge, juror or lawyer), and one’s acting simply as a private person. Since one
person is both an institutional entity and a private person, professionalism entails one’s awareness
that this distinction is called for and one’s commitment and ability to realize it in practice.
258. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 95 (italics retained).
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assertion that dominates ordinary morality[.]”259 But my analysis of the
lawyer’s dual roles and the role hierarchy in which she functions shows that
the lawyer-as-actor analogy is not so facile, and thus remains useful: the nested
structure of her roles harmonizes her identity, not only affording her the
possibility of integrity but requiring it of her if she is to function ethically as a
person and as a vital organ of the legal system. The lawyer’s underlying and
limiting identity as an officer of the court, if realized (as it should be), can do
much to prevent the lawyer from betraying her own sense of truth and
justice—not personally through self-assertion—but professionally through the
assertion that she is always already a court officer.
Markovits and Charles Curtis both have identified lying260 and cheating261
as vices necessary to the lawyer. Both tie these vices to a division of labor
between the lawyer and the judge: for Markovits this division is moral and
gives rise to the lawyerly vices, whereas for Curtis the division tracks an
ostensibly neat division between fact and law.262 Both sense limits to these
vices,263 and both preserve a space for the lawyer’s exercise of professional
(not personal moral) judgment. Curtis describes the lawyer’s stoic detachment
that allows her to provide objective counsel;264 this detachment resonates with
the maieutic bracketing and the locus of independent professional judgment
that I describe, Gordon’s empty stage, Spaulding’s thin professional identity,
and Markovits’ negative capability. Interestingly, both Curtis and Markovits
“[c]ompare the lawyer with the poet”265: in Curtis’ view, the lawyer’s zeal and
identity with the client require that “you suspend both belief and disbelief” just
as “[i]f you read poetry as poetry.”266

259. Id. at 5.
260. Curtis, supra note 87, at 8 (“He must lie . . . beyond the point where he could
permissibly lie for himself.”).
261. Id. at 9 (“A lawyer is required to be disingenuous. He is required to make statements as
well as arguments which he does not believe in.”).
262. In Curtis’ analysis responsibility for fact rests with the lawyer, while that for law belongs
to the judge, and thus a lawyer may hide unfavorable factual information from the judge but not
unfavorable law. Id. at 11 (“The court has priority over the client in matters of law and the client
has a priority over the court in matters of fact.”); see also id. at 10. This distinction is facile, most
obviously when the judge is the fact-finder.
263. Id. at 7 (“I take it that it is inadmissible to lie to the court.”). Yet Curtis also assumes
that despite the lawyer’s ability to hide unfavorable facts, in court “[t]he whole has been shaken
out into the sun[.]” Id. at 12.
For Markovits, the lawyerly virtues in a sense limit the vices. See supra note 258 and
accompanying text.
264. Curtis, supra note 87, at 18 (“The full discharge of a lawyer’s duty to his client requires
him to withhold something.”); see also id. at 18–20.
265. Id. at 23.
266. Id. at 21.
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Curtis senses but is ultimately confused by the primacy of the lawyer’s role
as an officer of the court. Citing Lord Brougham and describing the lawyer’s
devotion to her client as “entire,” Curtis yet asks, “How far must a lawyer
accompany his client and turn his back on the court?”267 Here he struggles
with the duality of the lawyer’s professional identity, lapsing into the idea that
the lawyer must either be her client’s advocate or an officer of the court.
Although he argues that lawyers must lie, for a moment he realizes that a
lawyer cannot lie to the court, because “[a] lawyer’s duty to his client cannot
rise higher than its source, which is the court”268. Even though he notes that it
is the court who requires her to advocate, he sees this duality of professional
identity as “paradoxical”269. The identity structure here presented resolves the
apparent paradox: the lawyer’s professional identities are nested, with the
fundamental identity as an officer of the court constraining the subsequent
identity as a legal representative of the client.
Without the limits flowing from the lawyer’s function as an officer of the
court in the structure of the adversarial legal system, lawyers’ unbridled
actions as mere client agents cannot sustain their commitments to their
professional roles, and instead capture their official power for an incomplete
set of private interests, undermining the possibility of justice—and further
undermining the legitimacy of the legal system by failing to justify courts’
reliance on lawyers. Thus, I maintain that the lawyer’s identity as an officer of
the court IS her distinctively lawyerly virtue, which entails the maieusis of the
commitments and values of the legal system through her professional
performance.
C. Reconstruction As an Answer to the Problem of Responsibility
Gerald Postema raised the concern that a lawyer’s thick identification with her
role would render her irresponsible, and thus threaten her integrity. He
referred to the problematic role that he had in mind as the “standard
conception” of the lawyer as a partisan whose “sole allegiance is to the
client . . . [w]ithin, but all the way up to, the limits of the law,”270 and as a
neutral with respect to the lawyer’s own opinion of the client’s morality. He
framed the problem with the standard conception as a “problem of
responsibility”271; by identifying too thickly with this role, the lawyer finds
herself in the situation where Markovits meets her:
[T]he lawyer is under great temptation to refuse to accept responsibility for his
professional actions and their consequences. Moreover, except when his

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 3.
Postema, supra note 85, at 73 (italics retained).
Id. at 74.
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beliefs coincide with those of his client, he lives with a recurring dilemma: he
must engage in activities, make arguments, and present positions which he
himself does not endorse or embrace. The lawyer’s integrity is put into
272
question by the mere exercise of the duties of his profession.

To prevent the lawyer’s disintegration, Postema contemplates “forging a
concrete alternative conception”273 of the lawyer’s role, which he sees as a
formidable task.
My analysis frames the problem of responsibility as a problem of
professional identity: how is the lawyer situated in the legal system, and what
is her function there? This approach identifies an already present concrete
alternative conception of the lawyer that preserves her integrity: her identity as
an officer of the court.
The officer-of-the-court analysis provides an “integrity-preserving rolebased redescription” for the lawyer that Markovits calls for, but one that does
not necessarily rely on the “authoritative insular[ity]”274 of the lawyer’s role
from which modernity abjects her. So, where Markovits sees that “as lawyers
are called on”—that is, interpellated by courts—”to integrate clients into a
process of adjudication that would otherwise be alien, they are denied the
cultural resources needed to shoulder the ethical burdens that arise on
answering this call. These burdens threaten to dis-integrate the lawyers
themselves”275—I see instead a more felicitous outcome for the lawyer who
shoulders the ethical responsibilities of the officer of the court whom she
becomes in answering the court’s interpellation.
The decisions to focus on the individual lawyer and adversariness per se
are errors of scale in this debate. Framing the lawyer as an advocate only—
ignoring her manifestation by, for, and subject to the court—is a failure to
appreciate the full tapestry of our Constitutionally provided social order,
marginalizing the lawyer’s duties to the judicial powers276 provided by the
Constitution. The bar is both the court and the legal profession of which the
lawyer is a member, and the client has not only individual, private interests but
a public interest in the rule of law. When we survey the design of our social
order, we perceive the lawyer not as a mere tool of the client, but as an
articulate instrument in the administration of justice.

272. Id. at 77.
273. Id. at 82.
274. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 243.
275. Id. at 13.
276. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Oxford English Dictionary Online, judicial, adj. and n., 1 (2d
ed. 1989) (“Of or belonging to judgement in a court of law, or to a judge in relation to this
function; pertaining to the administration of justice.”).
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